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Articles
FRAUD BY HINDSIGHT*
Mitu Gulati**
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski*
Donald C. Langevoort'***
INTRODUCTION
"In sum, the complaint is an example of allegingfraud by hindsight."
-Judge Henry Friendly, in his 1978 opinion Denny v. Barber'
Most people today believe that Enron's CEO, Ken Lay, knew his subor-
dinates were rigging the corporate books. Likewise, it is not hard to believe
that the managers at MCI, WorldCom, and Tyco knew their businesses were
performing badly even as they issued rosy forecasts. It also is hard to believe
that twenty years ago the management at Apple failed to predict that the Mac-
intosh predecessor, "Lisa," was a doomed product, whose release was a futile
act intended only to boost stock prices. Most of us recognize, however, that
hindsight colors these beliefs. Events tend to seem more predictable than
may have been the case.' One could recount this tale for a thousand other
corporate failures. What looks today like fraud, in many circumstances might
have once been nothing more than misplaced optimism. Small wonder then
that courts worry about "fraud by hindsight" in cases alleging securities fraud.
* We are grateful for advice and assistance from Stephen Bainbridge, Harold Bloomenthal, William
Bratton, Shari Diamond, Caroline Gentile, Jill Fisch, Theresa Gabaldon, Neal Katyal, Kim Krawiec,
Donna Nagy, Adam Pritchard, Poonam Puri, Judith Resnik, Joel Seligman, Steve Thel, Katherine Zeiler,
and Ben Zipursky, and from participants at presentations at Fordham Law School, Georgetown Law
Center, The University of Cincinnati Law School, the 2001 Law & Society Association Meetings, the
2001 Canadian Law and Economics Association Meetings, and the 2002 American Law and Economics
Association meetings. Sharlet Abarr, Erin Dengan, and tdeanna Johnson-Chebbi assisted us with the
data. We owe a special debt to Linda Carr O'Connor of the UCLA Library and Tracey Bridgeman of
the Georgetown Law Library for their assistance in structuring the data searches. Research funding was
provided by the Georgetown-Sloan Project and the UCLA Law School.
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; Visiting Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978) (emphasis added).
2 See Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight --Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under
Uncertainty, I J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 288 (1975) (documenting the effects of hindsight on judgment).
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Hindsight blurs the distinction between fraud and mistake. People
consistently overstate what could have been predicted after events have un-
folded-a phenomenon psychologists call the hindsight bias? People be-
lieve they could have predicted events better than was actually the case and
believe that others should have been able to predict them. Consequently,
they blame others for failing to have foreseen events that reasonable people
in foresight could not have foreseen.4 In the context of securities regulation,
hindsight can mistakenly lead people to conclude that a bad outcome was
not only predictable, but was actually predicted by managers.' Even in the
absence of any misconduct, a bad outcome alone might lead people to be-
lieve that corporate managers committed securities fraud. The hindsight
bias thus creates a considerable obstacle to the fundamental task in securi-
ties regulation of sorting fraud from mistake.
Punishing mistakes as if they were fraud undermines the deterrent
function of securities regulation.6 If corporate managers are as likely to be
punished for bad decisions as for acts of fraud, then the securities laws pro-
vide little real disincentive to engage in fraud. The recent financial scandals
raise precisely this concern. How could managers at Enron and others who
were manipulating revenue reports have thought that they could continue to
do so indefinitely? Indeed, given the high likelihood of getting caught, few
instances of alleged securities fraud make much sense.' This question has
3 See id. at 289. For discussions of the hindsight bias on legal judgments, see Hal R. Arkes & Cindy
A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business Judgment Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR.
L. REV. 587 (1994); Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Be-
liefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 661-62 (1997); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHi. L. REv. 571 (1998).
4 See Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post - Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hind-
sight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1995) (describing research indicating that the hindsight bias leads
people to over-attribute blame).
5 One finds numerous discussions of the hindsight problem in discussions of securities disclosure law
by members of the securities bar, including, on occasion, references to the psychological literature on the
bias. See, e.g., Herbert S. Wander, Securities Law Disclosure After Sarbanes Oxley, 1381 PLIICORP 11,52,
55, 60 (2003) (discussing the problem of courts judging securities disclosure questions in hindsight); Her-
bert S. Wander & Russell N. Pallesen, Developments in Securities Law Disclosure, 908 PLI/CoRP 327, 399,
447, 497-98 (1995) (similar concern); C. Evan Stewart, Basics of Accounting and Finance-What Every
Practicing Lawyer Needs to Know: Liability for Securities Lawyers in the Post-Enron Era, 1380 PLYCoRP
1075, 1090 & n.2 (2003) (citing to the academic literature on the hindsight bias). Going back in time, to the
year after Judge Friendly uttered the phrase "fraud by hindsight," one sees the concern about courts judging
securities matters in hindsight expressed in the leading securities disclosure articles of the time. See Jeffrey
D. Bauman, Rule lOb-5 and the Corporation's Affirmative Duty to Disclose, 67 GEO. L.J. 935, 939 (1979)
(describing the unfairness of penalizing corporations because of hindsight-biased judgments); Ted J. Fiflis,
Soft Information: The SEC's Former Exogenous Zone, 26 UCLA L. REv. 95, 96 (1978) (noting the prob-
lem of courts being willing to second guess disclosure decisions by managers).
6 See Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 596-600 (discussing the tendency for the hindsight bias to under-
mine the deterrent function of law).
See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corpora-
tions Mislead Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REv. 101 (1997)
(discussing why corporate managers might mislead the public).
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many answers, but one of them might well be the inability of the courts in
securities fraud cases to sort fraud from mistake accurately.'
Courts' difficulties with sorting fraud from mistake accurately is not
the result of ignorance of the basing effects of hindsight. Courts cite con-
cerns with hindsight in nearly one-third of all published opinions in securi-
ties class action cases.9 As the epithet at the beginning of this Article
shows, courts seem generally aware of the problem posed by judging secu-
rities fraud cases in hindsight. Judges routinely admonish plaintiffs not to
rely on hindsight to support allegations of fraud in pleading securities
claims. Increasingly, the doctrine against "fraud by hindsight" ("FBH") has
become a hurdle that plaintiffs in securities cases must overcome
The FBH doctrine arises from judges' awareness that knowledge of the
bad outcome biases judgments in favor of concluding that fraud had oc-
curred, even if it had not."° Arguably, the FBH doctrine reveals judges to be
intuitive psychologists, struggling to correct for the influence of the hind-
sight bias on litigation." A properly debiased system of litigation would
accurately sort the cases of fraud from innocently mistaken predictions,
thereby maintaining the deterrent function of the securities fraud system.
The FBH doctrine might thus reflect an effort to debias the adjudication
process in securities cases.
The relationship between the FBH doctrine and the hindsight bias,
however, might be epiphenomenal. The notion that a serious bias in judg-
ment affects the system, however, gives judges a legitimate justification for
departing from the notice pleading system and actively judging cases on the
merits at an early stage of litigation. Several aspects of both securities liti-
gation and the hindsight bias support this "case management" over a "debi-
8 The recent financial scandals have resulted in a spate of articles and symposia analyzing the possi-
ble causes and cures. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L.
REV. 1023 (2003); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1293 (2003); Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric,
Light Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CoNN. L. REV. 915 (2003); Robert W. Hamilton, The Crisis
in Corporate Governance: 2002 Style, 40 Hous. L. REV. 1 (2003); see also Panel Discussion, The Pri-
vate Securities Law Reform Act: Is It Working?, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2363 (2003) (discussing the im-
pact of the PSLRA).
9 See infra Part IV.A.
10 One court has described the "typical fraud by hindsight case" as one in which:
[T]he defendant company has experienced some business misfortune which is ultimately reported
in its own periodic reports to stockholders and in the financial press. The publication of this in-
formation produces a drop in the market price of the company's stock and many unhappy stock-
holders. The suit which follows normally alleges that information concerning the impending
misfortune or its root causes was omitted from earlier management publications despite the fact
that management then knew the information. The omitted material is frequently contrasted with
optimistic rhetoric from the pre-misfortune period in connection with an assertion that the earlier
publications were false and misleading.
Klein v. King, No. C-88-3141, 1990 WL 61950, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26,1990).
11 See Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 602-24 (arguing that courts engage in efforts to correct for the in-
fluence of hindsight bias in a wide range of cases).
98:773 (2004)
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asing" account of the FBH doctrine. First, the influence of hindsight on
judgment is notoriously difficult to avoid. 2 It might be unrealistic to sup-
pose that courts have developed a sensible response in just the few decades
of active private securities litigation. Second, although securities cases of-
ten include high-profile claims that might be attractive for judges to resolve,
these cases also commonly produce a quagmire of discovery disputes and
time-consuming procedural motions. Third, judges are also somewhat sus-
picious of these cases and might be motivated to police them early in the
litigation process. Rather than a debiasing effort, the FBH doctrine might
be one of several mechanisms courts have developed for managing securi-
ties fraud actions in the federal courts.'
3
A number of scholars (including all three of us) have remarked that the
emergence of the FBH doctrine is linked to the hindsight bias. 4 Thus far,
however, the discussions of the FBH doctrine have been brief and have
lacked a systematic examination of whether the doctrine represents an hon-
est effort to guard against the hindsight bias. This Article tests the compet-
ing hypotheses that the FBH doctrine is either a debiasing effort or a case-
management strategy, using a variety of methods. We trace the history and
development of the doctrine to determine whether its origins suggest debi-
asing or other motives. We then provide empirical evidence to identify
what circumstances lead judges to use the doctrine and how judges' reliance
on the doctrine relates to case outcomes. These statistics test whether the
doctrine is used in circumstances in which it makes sense from a debiasing
perspective. Finally, we use traditional legal analysis (reading the cases) to
assess whether the substance of the doctrine maps well onto a debiasing
strategy. Our study is thus a quasi-empirical examination of judicial opin-
ions in securities fraud cases.
To give away the punchline early, our analysis reveals that the FBH
doctrine is not an effort to control the influence of the hindsight bias in se-
curities litigation, but is part of an effort to manage securities cases. Al-
though case management can take many forms, from limiting discovery to
facilitating settlement, 5 in this context, judges are seeking to manage secu-
12 See Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past Events After the Out-
comes Are Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 311, 312 (1990) (describing the difficulty of avoiding the hind-
sight bias).
13 See Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Eve-
rybody Else Does-Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMoRY L.J. 83
(2002) (describing rules of thumb judges adopt in securities fraud cases).
14 Id. at 126-29; Langevoort, supra note 3, at 661-62; Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 615-17; see also
Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REv. 407, 433-34 (2002) (discussing the
problem of the hindsight bias in securities cases); Eric Talley, Disclosure Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1955, 2000 n.121 (2001) (discussing the role of the hindsight bias in securities-fraud cases). For an arti-
cle predating FBH discussions in the literature that identified the problem of judges or juries evaluating
scienter in hindsight, see Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud,
38 ARIz. L. REv. 639, 644-46 (1996).
t5 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374 (1982).
HeinOnline -- 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 776 2003-2004
Fraud by Hindsight
rities cases through a thinly disguised effort to screen securities cases at an
early stage of the proceedings.
Although the creation of the FBH doctrine can plausibly be traced to
efforts to reduce the effect of the hindsight bias, the development of the
doctrine does not effectively track the underlying limitation on judgment.
First, courts apply the doctrine to determinations that are the least likely to
be affected by the hindsight bias and fail to apply it where the bias is most
likely to play a role. Second, they apply the doctrine primarily at the plead-
ings stage-when outcome knowledge is most relevant to an assessment of
whether fraud occurred. Third, the manner in which the doctrine is applied
makes it unlikely to guard against the hindsight bias; judges rely on their
own impressions of the case, assuming they are free from the effects of the
bias. Fourth, even though the hindsight bias can benefit or harm a plain-
tiffs case, judges selectively target the FBH doctrine at instances in which
the doctrine benefits plaintiffs. Finally, the doctrine has not gained any nu-
ance or subtlety over time; instead, it has merely expanded to facilitate
greater authority for judges to screen securities cases on the pleadings.
Even if early adjudication of securities cases makes sense, it comes at a
price. The use of hindsight as a pretense for case management leaves many
residual problems with the system of private securities litigation. Instead of
developing a serious effort to reduce the influence of hindsight, judges as-
sume they can identify those cases that raise real suspicion of fraud without
the influence of the hindsight bias. Research suggests that this is not realis-
tic. Studies show that judges are vulnerable to the bias, 6 and that mere
awareness of the phenomenon does not ameliorate its influence on judg-
ment. 7 The failure to develop a doctrine that addresses the underlying
problem of judging in hindsight means that the adverse consequences of the
hindsight bias remain a part of securities litigation. Judges are not accu-
rately sorting fraud from mistake, thereby undermining the system, even as
they seek to improve it.
Part I of this Article describes the role that the hindsight bias might
play in securities fraud cases. Part II develops a set of predictions about
what one would expect to see if judges were to put in place an effective pro-
tection against the hindsight bias in the securities fraud context. We con-
trast those predictions with the predictions that arise from a competing
model of judicial behavior, one where judges use the specter of the hind-
sight bias to further other goals. Part III begins our test of the competing
hypotheses by tracing the development of the FBH doctrine. Part IV sets
out our observations from examining the 300-plus securities class action
16 See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 799-805 (2001);
John C. Anderson et al., The Mitigation of Hindsight Bias in Judges' Evaluation of Auditor Decisions,
AUDITING: J. PRACTICE & THEORY, Fall 1997, at 20.
17 See Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 586-88 (reviewing interventions designed to mitigate the hind-
sight bias).
98:773 (2004)
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opinions that have invoked the phrase "fraud by hindsight" between 1978
and 2002. Part V then matches up the observations from Part IV against the
two contrasting sets of predictions from the models. Finally, Part VI per-
forms an additional set of tests on the models that emerge from Part V.
I. HINDSIGHT IN SECURITIES LITIGATION: Two THEORIES
In cases alleging securities fraud, courts must determine what corpo-
rate managers knew and when they knew it. Such judgments might be
clouded by the present knowledge of how events ultimately unfolded. In
many contexts, courts have developed adaptations to the problem of judging
in hindsight.' The FBH doctrine might be one such adaptation. Alterna-
tively, the invocation of the FBH doctrine might mask a judicial effort to
gain greater control over these cases. In this Part, we describe these two
possible explanations for the development of the FBH doctrine.
A. The Debiasing Hypothesis
The development of the FBH doctrine might represent a clever judicial
adaptation to the cognitive limitations of human judgment. Judicial concern
with judging in hindsight is well founded. Psychologists who study human
judgment and choice have found that people overstate the predictability of
outcomes-a phenomenon that psychologists refer to as the hindsight bias. 9
Psychologist Baruch Fischhoff describes the bias as follows:
In hindsight, people consistently exaggerate what could have been anticipated
in foresight. They not only tend to view what has happened as having been in-
evitable but also view it as having appeared "relatively inevitable" before it
happened. People believe that others should have been able to anticipate
events much better than was actually the case.20
Hindsight bias is a well-understood and extensively documented bias
in human judgment.2' It occurs because people integrate their knowledge of
the outcome into a coherent set of beliefs.2 When people learn how events
unfold, they learn more than just the outcome. Outcome knowledge also
teaches people something about why that outcome occurred. People natu-
rally make secondary inferences about the causal events leading up to the
outcome. Even if people could suppress their knowledge of the outcome,
18 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR.
L. REv. 61, 70-73 (2000) (arguing that courts adapt to cognitive errors in judgment).
19 See Hawkins & Hastie, supra note 12, at 311.
20 Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned To Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight,
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 335, 341 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.,
1982).
21 See Hawkins & Hastie, supra note 12, at 314 (identifying a "substantial record" of hindsight bias
studies, making it a "well-established" finding).
22 See id. at 320-23 (describing explanations for the hindsight bias); Rachlinski, supra note 3, at
584-86 (recounting cognitive explanations for the hindsight bias).
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they cannot suppress their newfound understanding of the ancillary circum-
stances surrounding that outcome.23
For example, suppose that a software company was attempting to de-
velop a new version of a popular word processing program that incorpo-
rated voice recognition software. Further suppose that the company
predicted that the product could be produced in six months. It might have
made this prediction based on the estimates of its software managers, with
some allowance for the estimated difficulty of the project and time needed
to debug the program. When people learn that the company failed to com-
plete the project within six months, they are apt to make several inferences
about the nature of the project. From the failure to meet the deadline, peo-
ple might (reasonably) infer that voice recognition is a trickier concept than
it might seem. When asked whether the company's managers knew that the
deadline was unattainable, people will tend to rely on this secondary infer-
ence about voice recognition, which the company managers themselves
would not necessarily have known beforehand. This reliance on inferences
made from knowing the outcome will lead people to overstate the predict-
ability of the outcome.
The hindsight bias causes little real harm in everyday life. Few judg-
ments require ignoring known outcomes. It is much more important to in-
corporate new knowledge and experience to make predictions about the
future than to re-predict the past. Indeed, the hindsight bias might be a
product of the importance of learning quickly and easily from experience.24
Automatically updating beliefs in light of new information is a valuable
cognitive skill in most situations. The mind so efficiently incorporates new
information into its view of the world, however, that it cannot disregard
new information and the inferences that new information inspire.
Re-predicting the past, however, is a ubiquitous task in the court-
room.25 The law is filled with requirements that courts determine what peo-
ple should have known, could have foreseen, and actually knew, all of
which are made in the full light of what is now known to all. Everything
from determining whether a defendant was negligent or determining
whether a manager's decision was so erroneous so as to constitute waste, to
identifying whether an invention was non-obvious, involve recreating an ex
ante judgment in the light of ex post knowledge. The cognitive processes
23 See Hawkins & Hastie, supra note 12, at 314-16.
24 See Stephen J. Hoch & George F. Loewenstein, Outcome Feedback: Hindsight and Information,
15 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, AND COGNITION, 605, 606-09 (1997) (describ-
ing the value of relying on outcome information); Ulrich Hoffrage & Ralph Hertwig, Hindsight Bias: A
Price Worth Paying for Fast and Frugal Memory, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 191,
191-92 (Gerd Gigerenzer et al. eds., 1999) (arguing that the hindsight bias is the product of useful cog-
nitive processes).
25 See Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 602-24 (identifying a wide range of legal judgments as poten-
tially affected by the hindsight bias).
98:773 (2004)
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that serve people well in most contexts might lead them astray in making
these unfamiliar legal judgments.
Courts have developed multiple adaptations designed to compensate
for the hindsight bias.26 In tort law, courts look for ex ante assessments of
what constitutes reasonable conduct, such as custom, rather than relying on
ex post judgments.27 Courts also suppress the introduction of evidence that
might exacerbate the hindsight bias, such as subsequent remedial measures
taken by a tort defendant.28 When determining the liability of corporate of-
ficers for mistaken decisions, courts refuse to hold defendants liable for
negligent decisions because judging in hindsight is too prone to error.29 Al-
though the courts have failed to recognize the influence of the hindsight
bias in some areas of law, our inquiry suggests that the bias is intuitive and
robust enough that the courts have largely adapted to its influence as best
they can.3"
Courts' adaptations to the hindsight bias have been subtle. They have
not settled for the usual judicial remedy for a possible misuse of evidence-
admonition against certain inferences.3' In many circumstances, courts at-
tempt to reduce unwanted uses of evidence and unjustified inferences by in-
structing the decision-maker to ignore evidence.32 In the case of the
hindsight bias, however, the psychological research indicates that mere
awareness of the bias does not reduce its influence on judgment.33 Conse-
quently, admonitions and instructions would be of no value. In keeping
with these findings, courts typically do not rely on warnings against making
inferences in hindsight. Courts, therefore, appear to be adapting well to the
problem of hindsight bias.34
On its face, the FBH doctrine appears to be another judicial adaptation
designed to reduce the biasing effects of judging corporate misconduct in
hindsight. The doctrine explicitly invokes the term "hindsight." In their
26 See id at 623-24 (summarizing adaptations to the influence of hindsight bias).
27 See id. at 608-13 (describing defenses based on compliance with ex ante norms as an adaptation
to the hindsight bias).
28 See id. at 617-18 (describing the suppression of subsequent remedial measures as an adaptation
to the hindsight bias); see also Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1984) ("It is
only because juries are believed to overreact to evidence of subsequent remedial measures that the ad-
missibility of such evidence could deter defendants from taking such measures.").
29 See Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 619-23; Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic
and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 Nw. U. L. REV.
675, 681 (2002) (discussing the problem of hindsight in the liability of corporate officers).
30 See Rachlinski, supra note 18, at 64-65 (noting that courts sometimes fail to notice the effects of
the hindsight bias).
31 See Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 602-05.
32 See id. at 602 ("Judicial instructions ... are [among the] usual quality-control mechanisms for
judgment in the courtroom.").
33 See id. at 586-88 (reviewing interventions designed to mitigate the hindsight bias).
34 See id at 602-05 (asserting that courts do not rely on admonitions as a means of correcting the
hindsight bias).
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opinions, judges explain that the FBH doctrine is a palliative for the influ-
ence of "20/20 hindsight," "second guessing," "Monday Morning Quarter-
backing," "clairvoyance," confusing "ex ante" with "ex post," and decision-
making using "crystal balls."35 Furthermore, when invoking the doctrine,
judges insist that plaintiffs do more than cite bad outcomes as evidence of
fraud, insisting that plaintiffs produce evidence "contemporaneous" to the
alleged fraud.36 Judges assert that a company's announcement of bad re-
sults, by itself, does not mean that a prior optimistic statement was fraudu-
lent.37 This seems to be an effort to divert attention away from the bad
outcome and toward the circumstances that gave rise to that outcome, which
is exactly the problem the hindsight bias raises. That is, if people over-
weigh the fact of a bad outcome in hindsight, then the cure is to reconstruct
the situation as people saw it beforehand. Thus, the development of the
FBH doctrine suggests a judicial understanding of the biasing effects of
judging in hindsight and of a means to address the problem.
To restate, the debiasing hypothesis supposes that judges have devel-
oped the FBH doctrine as an attempt to insulate judgments from the hind-
sight bias. To reduce the adverse effects of the biases, judges must
recognize limitations on the ability to make accurate judgments in court.
The debiasing hypothesis suggests that judges have both recognized this
limitation and devised a means to correct for it.
35 See, e.g., In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., 277 F.3d 658, 673 (3d Cir. 2002) ("[T]o give rise to
section 10(b) liability for fraud, the mere second-guessing of calculations will not suffice .... "); id. (cit-
ing Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978), for the proposition that there is no FBH "be-
cause the law does not require clairvoyance"); In re Burlington Coat Factory See. Reg., 114 F.3d 1410,
1429 n. 16 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Securities laws approach matters from an ex ante perspective. The fact that
we see in hindsight that earnings per share did in fact turn out to be roughly within the range they were
projected does not tell us conclusively that the forecasts were reasonable at the time they were made."
(citation omitted)); Stranksy v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he securi-
ties laws typically do not act as a Monday Morning Quarterback. 'The securities laws approach matters
from an ex ante perspective: just as a statement true when made does not become fraudulent because
things unexpectedly go wrong, so a statement materially false when made does not become acceptable
because it happens to come true.' (citing Pommer v. Medtest Corp., 961 F.2d 620, 623 (7th Cir. 1992));
Feasby v. Industri-Matematik Int'l Corp., No. 99 Civ 8761, 2000 WL 977673, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 17,
2000) ("Plaintiffs cannot prevail [on a l0b-5 fraud claim] by using crystal balls or 20/20 hind-
sight .. "); Borow v. nView Corp., 829 F. Supp. 828, 833 n.7 (E.D. Va. 1993) ("[P]laintiffs have failed
to allege that materially misleading statements were made. Instead, they have relied on 20/20 hindsight
to insinuate that later shortcomings amounted to earlier fraud."); In re Donald J. Trump Sec. Litig., 793
F. Supp 543, 556-57 (D.N.J. 1992) ("We are wary, too, of the dangers raised by claims of 'fraud by
hindsight.' Monday morning quarterbacking cannot present actionable securities fraud claims .. ").
36 See, e.g., Polk v. Fritz, No. C96-2712, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23063, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5,
1998). The court explained:
[P]laintiffs cannot plead "fraud by hindsight," in which later events are used to support the falsity
of earlier statements. Instead, a plaintiff must set forth not only why a given statement was false
or misleading, but why it was false or misleading when made. This is done most directly by citing
inconsistent contemporaneous statements or internal information available to defendants.
Id. (citations omitted).
37 See, e.g., Berliner v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 783 F. Supp. 708, 710 (D. Mass. 1992).
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B. The Case Management Hypothesis
Despite appearances, it might be unrealistic to suppose that judges
have developed this clever adaptation to resolve a psychological phenome-
non. Instead, the references to hindsight might be little more than a pretext
for legitimizing greater judicial control over securities fraud cases filed in
federal court. The FBH doctrine might not really be a well-developed adap-
tation, but might serve merely as a judging "heuristic" or "shortcut" that al-
lows judges to sort what they perceive to be plausible and frivolous cases
early in the litigation process."
As with the debiasing hypothesis, a number of factors support the case
management hypothesis. Judges routinely express concern that securities
class actions are often lawyer-driven suits brought in the hope of settling for
their nuisance value.39 Judges are not alone in expressing this concern; aca-
demics have complained that these suits settle without regard to merit and
do little to deter real fraud, operating instead as a needless tax on capital
raising." Federal judges, faced with overwhelming caseloads, must allocate
38 For a set of contrasting perspectives on the use of heuristics or shortcuts by judges in the securi-
ties-fraud area, see Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 13; Donald C. Langevoort, Are Judges Motivated
To Create "Good" Securities Fraud Doctrine?, 51 EMORY L.J. 309 (2002); Hillary A. Sale, Judging
Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903 (2002).
39 For examples of cases in which the judges discuss the problem of strike suits in conjunction with
FBH, see Katz v. Household International, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 1106, 1110 (N.D. Il1. 1995), and In re
Copley Pharmaceutical., Inc., No. 94-11897, 1995 WL 169215, at *5 (D. Mass. Mar. 16, 1995).
40 In the pre-Enron era, this was a question of significant academic debate. See, e.g., Janet Cooper
Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV.
497, 570-77 (1991); James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evi-
dence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 903, 918-23 (1996); Joseph A. Grundfest, Disim-
plying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission 's Authority, 107
HARV. L. REV. 963 (1994); Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of
the Effect of the PSLRA 's Internal-Information Standard on '33 and '34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. U. L.Q.
537, 552-55 (1998); Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor Grundfest 's "Dis-
implying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority",
108 HARV. L. REV. 438 (1994); James Hamilton, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
932 PLI/CORP. 475 (1996). The popular press echoed the concern about excessive suits. See, e.g.,
Cindy Krischer Goodman, Shareholders Find Benefits, Limits To Suing Firms When Stock Price Plum-
mets, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 3, 2000, at 2 (describing the recent increase in the number of shareholder
lawsuits filed); Cindy Krischer Goodman, Lawyer King of Stock Fraud Suits: When Prices Take Dra-
matic Fall, Shareholders Call Melvin Weiss, HoUS. CHRON., Jan. 9, 2000, at 2 (noting that "[w]hen a
company's stock drops precipitously, [shareholders' attorneys] often file a lawsuit within days, some-
times hours"); Kelly Greene & Carrick Mollenkamp, MedPartners Settles Suits By Investors, WALL ST.
J., July 28, 1999, at F I (observing that the number of shareholder securities lawsuits in the Southeast is
"skyrocketing"). These concerns resonated with Congress as well. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104-98, at 9
(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 688; 141 CONG. REC. H15215 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995)
(statement of Rep. Bliley) (likening "strike suits" to extortion); 141 CONG. REc. H 15216 (daily ed. Dec.
20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Fields) (recognizing that many shareholders file lawsuits "only because the
market price on the securities has dropped"). Ultimately, these beliefs appear to have motivated Con-
gress to reform the securities laws in 1995. See Elliott J. Weiss, Pleading Securities Fraud, 64 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (2001) (describing congressional goals in enacting the PSLRA).
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their limited resources.4' Securities lawsuits that are often complex,
lengthy, and perceived to be extortionate are unlikely to be a high priority.
Judges might thus embrace any doctrine that allows them to dispose of
these cases quickly.
Additionally, the debiasing hypothesis arguably gives judges too much
credit. Although other areas of law seem to have developed adaptations to
the hindsight bias,42 the best adaptations tend to be found in common-law
cases. These developments may have taken generations of judicial opinions
and thousands of cases of judges building on past mistakes. Claims brought
under the federal securities laws are, relative to the common law, a novel
development. Judges have only had a couple of decades of experience with
them. Judges have thus had little chance to learn from experience and per-
haps little opportunity to recognize the bias, to say nothing of developing
adaptations.43
Other aspects of federal securities cases make it difficult for judges to
create sensible doctrine. First, it is probably safe to assume that few federal
judges have a background in psychology. Even though the existence of the
hindsight bias is intuitive, the cognitive processes that produce the bias are
complex. Thus, efforts to ameliorate the influence of the bias can be elu-
sive. Second, the voluminous records (even at the preliminary motion
stages) that securities cases frequently create can overwhelm judges. Be-
cause of the high stakes in these cases, they tend to be argued by lawyers
who devote enormous attention to them, thereby creating even more paper
for the judge to sort through. The intricacies these cases can create thereby
leave the judge with little time to develop a careful response to any one as-
41 Numerous commentators have documented the dramatic increase in the volume of cases in the
federal courts over the past few decades. See, e.g., Jeffrey 0. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive
Virtues and Casual Vices in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 685, 690-94 (2000);
Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 1996 WiS.
L. REV. 11, 26; Robert M. Parker & Ron Chapman, Jr., Accepting Reality: The Time for Adopting Dis-
cretionary Review in the Courts of Appeal Has Arrived, 50 SMU L. REv. 573, 574-76 (1996); see also
COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. CTS., FINAL REPORT 14 & tbls.2-3 (providing
numbers showing how the rise in numbers of judgeships has not kept pace with the rise in the number of
filings).
42 See Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 602-24 (describing adaptations to the hindsight bias in law).
43 On the other hand, a proponent of the debiasing hypothesis might counter that, while securities-
fraud class actions are a relatively recent phenomena, the key question here is the judgment of fraud us-
ing the benefit of hindsight. And that latter question has been around as long as there have been lawsuits
for fraud, that is, centuries. Indeed, we have seen expressions of concern about hindsight bias in the
common law securities disclosure cases from the 1930s that were the predecessors of the current federal
actions. See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (Mass. 1933) (giving, as a reason for not requiring
disclosure of a speculative theory about the possible presence of copper on a certain piece of land, that
"[d]isclosure of the theory, if it ultimately proved to be erroneous... might [lead to litigation]"). For an
early federal securities case articulating such a concern (but not the FBH doctrine), see SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulfur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 280 (S.D.N.Y 1966), which explains that "the test of materiality must
necessarily be a conservative one, particularly since many actions under Section 10(b) are brought on
the basis of hindsight".
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pect of a securities case. Third, these cases frequently become cluttered
with discovery disputes, motions for sanctions, and other ancillary disputes
that further draw on the judge's resources. Even the most diligent judge
can get lost in the procedural mire that a complex securities class action
case can create.
With all this in mind, it is important to note that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure discourage judging cases on their merits until after the con-
clusion of discovery.' The Rules' "notice pleading" system deliberately
keeps the barriers to entry into the court system low.45 Many scholars have
argued that system makes it too easy for plaintiffs to bring securities cases
into the courts.46 As a general matter, notice pleading is on the defensive in
many areas as concern with frivolous litigation spreads.4 7 Doctrines that al-
low judges to sort and manage cases before discovery have begun to arise
with increasing frequency in many areas of law.48
These concerns have led courts and Congress to raise the pleading
standards in securities fraud cases. Judges in a number of circuits (most no-
tably, the Second, which has traditionally been the leader in making securi-
ties law doctrine) began to require not only that the elements of a fraud
claim be pled with particularity as required by Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure Rule 9(b), but also that plaintiffs allege facts that produce a strong in-
ference of scienter.49 Scienter is the state of mind required for such a fraud
claim and is satisfied if the misconduct is "knowing or intentional."5
Heightening the barriers on the pleading of state of mind went against Rule
9(b)'s admonition that state of mind could be pled generally, the assump-
tion being that facts going to the defendant's state of mind would be un-
likely to emerge until after discovery." On that basis, the Ninth Circuit
refused to follow the lead of the Second.52 In 1995, however, through the
passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the
"PSLRA"), Congress explicitly ratified the Second Circuit's approach. 3 In
44 See Resnik, supra note 15, at 383-85 (documenting the structure of the system of civil litigation
in the federal courts).
45 See RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE 1078-80
(8th ed. 2003) (describing the system of notice pleading in the federal courts).
46 See generally Alexander, supra note 40; Grundfest, supra note 40.
47 See Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551 (2002) (arguing that no-
tice pleading generally is in a state of decline).
48 See Resnik, supra note 15, at 378-80 (documenting the growing trend toward active case man-
agement among judges).
49 This evolution is described in Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Per-
sonality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV.
627, 652 (2002).
50 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
51 FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
52 In re Glenfed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1545 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
53 See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 49, at 650-75 (describing the passage of the PSLRA and
the cases that followed).
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both contexts, the concern that plaintiffs often plead "fraud by hindsight"
provided justification for raising barriers to entry into court. 4
To restate, the case management hypothesis supposes that judges have
developed the FBH doctrine as an attempt to gain control over securities
fraud cases.55 The reference to the biasing effects of hindsight might thus
provide only the ostensible justification for departing from the open notice
pleading system laid down in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rather
than as a careful effort to control bias, judges are using the real influence of
the hindsight bias as a pretext for judging cases on the merits early in the
litigation process.
II. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THE Two ACCOUNTS
The debiasing and case management accounts of the FBH doctrine will
produce different patterns of case law. Both hypotheses predict that courts
will cite the doctrine when dismissing cases, but the two accounts will pro-
duce subtle differences that distinguish which of the two hypotheses best
describes courts' behavior. Specifically, the two theories predict differ-
ences: in what stage of the proceedings the FBH doctrine will apply; to
what elements of securities fraud the FBH doctrine will apply; what the ap-
propriate remedy for the influence of hindsight will be; whether the doctrine
will apply to "reverse hindsight"; and how the FBH doctrine will develop.
A. When Does the FBH Doctrine Apply?
Judicial interventions to remedy the hindsight bias can occur at several
stages of the litigation process. Courts can actively scrutinize the pleadings
for cases that look like they might be founded on hindsight, grant summary
judgment more willingly for defendants, adopt rules of evidence designed
to reduce the influence of the hindsight bias, develop heightened standards
of proof to ameliorate the effect of the bias, or be open to the possibility
that a jury verdict was the product of hindsight and hence be more willing
to grant judgment as a matter of law. As discussed below, as a lawsuit pro-
ceeds, the influence of the hindsight bias becomes more pronounced.
Hence, if the FBH doctrine represents an effort to guard against the hind-
sight bias, it will become more of a factor as a case proceeds. In contrast, if
the FBH doctrine reflects only an active effort to screen cases at an early
stage, then it will be more of a factor early in the process.
54 See infra Part VI.
55 Although we term this thesis the "case management hypothesis" (in contrast to the "debiasing"
hypothesis), we recognize that "case management" has many meanings. Judges can manage cases in a
wide variety of ways, only one of which is to dispose of a case at an early stage of the proceedings. The
"early adjudication" hypothesis might thus be a more accurate description of this theory than the "case
management" hypothesis. Because the early adjudication arises from an effort to manage securities
cases effectively, however, we retain the term "case management."
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Even though knowledge of an outcome is misleading, an outcome can
be a useful guide in determining the predictability of past events under
some circumstances. 6 Intuitively, knowing that the outcome differed from
a company's forecast suggests that the decision-making process was faulty
or that the company's managers were engaged in intentional misconduct.
Logic supports this intuition. If poor predictions and misconduct are more
likely to produce a failed forecast than good predictions and honest con-
duct, then the fact of the bad outcome, by itself, supports an inference that
the conduct was unreasonable.
The relevance of the outcome to an assessment of fraud depends upon
whether the managers have some ability to make accurate forecasts. When
the managers have some ability to predict the outcome, their forecasts
should tend to be accurate and fraud becomes a plausible explanation for an
inaccurate prediction. Under these circumstances, a judge operating in
hindsight should rely on the outcome as an indicator of fraud. To be sure,
evidence of a failed forecast does not necessarily mean that fraud was more
likely than not; this conclusion would depend upon the rate at which fraud
can be expected to occur and on the predictive ability of the managers.
Also, the psychological literature suggests that even when the outcome is
relevant to the sensibility of the process, people attach too much weight to
the outcome, a phenomenon known as the "outcome bias."57 Consequently,
judges might overstate the relevance of the outcome to the determination of
fraud. So long as the managers can make forecasts with some degree of ac-
curacy, however, the accuracy of their forecasts alone is relevant to the like-
lihood that the inaccurate forecast was the result of fraud.
This analysis does not mean that the hindsight bias is not a bias.
Judges commonly have much more information available than just the ac-
curacy of the managers' forecasts. In a lawsuit, the adversarial system will
likely ensure that the judge has at least as much information available as the
managers did before making their predictions. In fact, because the dispute
in the lawsuit is more focused than the diffuse predictions of the managers,
and the stakes are larger and more well-defined than they were ex ante, the
judges may have an even greater ability to make accurate forecasts than the
managers did, even though they lack the managers' expertise.5 8 The infor-
56 See Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation, 54 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 569, 570 (1988) (describing the relevance of outcome in evaluating decision quality).
57 Psychologists refer to an excessive reliance on the outcome as the "outcome bias." See id. at
569-71.
58 The general point is that it may be less important to avoid errors (and allow evidence of ambigu-
ous value) at early stages of the litigation if there are later stages at which errors will likely be corrected.
But this general point can get flipped around when one adds other considerations, such as the cost of
each additional stage. For economic analyses of the value of accuracy at different points in the litigation
process, see Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994), and Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24
J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (1995). We are indebted to Steven Shavell for helping us work through this point.
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mation available to the judges will reduce, or even eliminate, the value of
knowing the outcome in assessing fraud.
As applied to the use of FBH, this analysis shows that courts should
use the doctrine only sparingly at the pleadings stage of proceedings. Cit-
ing the influence of hindsight in support of a dismissal at the pleadings
stage of a securities suit, in fact, has a somewhat different meaning than
dismissing a case at the summary judgment stage. Because most securities
cases involve an allegation of fraud,59 they must comport with the require-
ments of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which requires that allega-
tions of fraud be "stated with particularity."6 Unlike most suits, pleadings
that must comply with Rule 9(b) must identify details supporting their the-
ory of recovery. This requirement allows courts to assess whether the de-
tails plead support the allegations. However, at this stage, a court must be
cautious. The case has not yet developed. In cutting off the case on the
pleadings by citing hindsight, the court is essentially making a prediction
that the discovery process will yield only evidence that requires the benefit
of the hindsight bias to seem adequate. At the summary judgment stage, by
contrast, the court actually has much of the evidence that was available to
the corporate managers and hence is in a position to ascertain the extent to
which their judgment is being influenced by hindsight. It is simply not ac-
curate to say that there is no fraud by hindsight at the pleadings stage; at
this stage, the allegation that a forecast has turned out to be inaccurate pro-
vides at least some affirmative evidence that fraud might have occurred.
Even the prevalence of an outcome bias does not undermine this con-
clusion. If judges are affected by the outcome bias at the pleadings stage,
then they will tend to see fraud where there was none, which is unfortunate.
Under a notice pleading system, however, judges are not supposed to assess
the merits of the case at the pleadings stage. Thus, even if the outcome bias
leads them to draw erroneous conclusions about the merits of the case, these
conclusions will not adversely affect the outcome of the case. Only during
dispositive proceedings, such as during a summary judgment motion or
judgment at trial, will the outcome and hindsight biases threaten to lead
courts to mistakenly label innocent conduct as fraud.
As a lawsuit proceeds to summary judgment or trial, however, the
situation changes. The court begins to learn the underlying facts that sup-
ported the forecast. Although judges are not business experts, they may
have a greater ability to forecast because the litigants will have focused
their energy on the specific forecast or forecasts that are the subject of the
59 Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000), is a general anti-
fraud provision. Most securities class actions are brought under section 10(b). When there is a public
offering, however, those who purchased in that offering, and satisfy the other conditions of that provi-
sion, can bring a claim under section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act, id. § 77k, without needing to allege
fraud.
60 FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
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lawsuit. At summary judgment, and more so at trial, the outcome fades in
importance relative to the pleadings stage. Even if the judges do not have
quite as much ability to predict the outcome as the managers, they have
more ability at the summary judgment stage than at the pleadings stage.
Thus, at this stage, the hindsight bias becomes a greater concern.
To the extent that courts are attempting to debias securities litigation,
they will largely refrain from applying the FBH doctrine at the pleadings
stage, but will apply it at the summary judgment stage instead. By contrast,
the case management hypothesis predicts that judges will cite the doctrine
as early as possible in an effort to police their dockets.
B. To Which Aspect of Securities Fraud Does the FBH Doctrine Apply:
Materiality Versus Scienter?
The hindsight bias implicates two distinct elements in securities fraud
claims: scienter and materiality.6 Scienter refers to the state of mind the
defendant-must possess for there to be a valid fraud claim under the federal
securities laws.62 The implication of the hindsight bias to determinations of
scienter is straightforward. A manager's knowledge of a violation or a high
degree of recklessness in allowing the violation will suffice to satisfy the
scienter requirement.63 The hindsight bias is implicated to the extent that
one is using evidence of an outcome (usually, a bad one) to assess whether
the manager knew of it ahead of time or was reckless in not knowing. As
noted, the bias makes unpredictable events seem predictable. Thus, hind-
sight might not only facilitate an inference that managers should have pre-
dicted an adverse event, but also that they did predict it.
A material event is one that a reasonable investor would consider im-
portant.' Here, given the occurrence of some bad event, the judge has to
assess whether a prior warning sign should have been recognized (and dis-
closed). The hindsight problem arises because, once the bad event has oc-
curred, the judge will be biased toward finding that the warning should have
been disclosed. Courts refer to the information regarding such warnings as
contingent.6 5 Examples include the following: early reports about problems
that customers are having with a new product; preliminary indications that a
lawsuit might not be going well; financial results for an early portion of a
quarter that are lower than those at the same point in time in prior quarters;
61 To state a securities-fraud claim, the plaintiff must allege "that in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities, the defendant, acting with scienter, made a false material representation or omitted to
disclose material information and that plaintiffs reliance on defendant's conduct caused [plaintiff] in-
jury." Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., 295 F.3d 312, 321 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
62 On the definition of scienter, see JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 730-34 (3d ed. 2001).
63 See id.
64 On the relationship between the reasonable investor and the market, see In re Sprint Corp. Sec.
Litig., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1217 (D. Kan. 2002).
65 See COX ET AL., supra note 62, at 44-52.
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or preliminary discussions about a possible merger or takeover.66 These
events themselves are not material except that they might warn of the pos-
sibility of some later bad event. When managers fail to disclose contingent
information, and the contingent event occurs, the hindsight bias will make
the contingent information seem more like an early warning of real prob-
lems to follow than was actually the case.
Although both scienter and materiality determinations present potential
hindsight bias problems, they have differences.67 First, the implication of
the bias for scienter is less direct than for contingent materiality. For the
bias to affect determinations of scienter, not only must the bias affect the
probability assessments of the judge, it must also lead the judge to make an
inference about the mental state of corporate managers.68 A conclusion that
managers should have been able to predict the adverse event does not sup-
port scienter; they must have actually made the prediction or at least reck-
lessly failed to make the prediction.69 In ex ante probability terms, this
means that the judge has to determine that the bad event was so likely to
occur at the time that the company made an optimistic forecast that making
the optimistic forecast amounted to something like deliberate indifference.
With the exception of a single study, all of the research on the hindsight
bias in legal contexts is limited to inferences of what people should have
known, not what they actually knew.7" This is not to say that the hindsight
bias cannot influence judgments of scienter.7" Rather, the point is that the
66 See id. (discussing cases).
67 For extensive discussions of scienter and materiality, see id. at 40-41 and 730-34.
68 See Mark Kelman et al., Decomposing Hindsight Bias, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 251 (1998)
(arguing that, under such circumstances, the bias has more of an indirect affect on judgment).
69 See COX T AL., supra note 62, at 730-34.
70 See Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 592 (reviewing the effect of the hindsight bias on judgments of
subjective beliefs). The exception is Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can't Do Well: The
Jury's Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901 (1998). This study has received severe
criticism. See Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive Damage Awards: Failures of a Social
Science Case for Change, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 867 (1999).
71 As one of us wrote in a recent article:
The nature of the hindsight bias suggests that the bias will result in judges and juries finding
defendants reckless (and liable for punitive damages) when they were not actually reckless. The
data on judging in hindsight clearly indicates that past events seem more predictable than they ac-
tually were. Nevertheless, it requires an extra logical inference from this overestimate to support
the conclusion that defendants were, in fact, reckless. Judges and juries must also assume that be-
cause past events were so predictable, the defendant actually did predict them. In other words, the
judge or jury must convert an objective conclusion (the event was predictable) into a subjective
one (the defendant did predict the unwanted outcome).
The evidence that the hindsight bias has this effect, however, is scant. Virtually all of the data
on the hindsight bias speak only to the objective judgment. One recent study, however, shows that
the hindsight bias leads people to conclude that others acted recklessly when they did not. Profes-
sors Reid Hastie and Kip Viscusi created a set of stimulus materials to directly test whether the
hindsight bias makes defendants appear more reckless than they actually were. To test this theory,
Hastie and Viscusi had one set of subjects review a set of trial-type materials to determine whether
an administrative agency was reckless for failing to close a dangerous section of railway track.
Another set of subjects assessed whether a railroad company that had a train wreck on this same
98:773 (2004)
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effect of the bias on the judgments might be more attenuated than in inquir-
ies under objective standards.72
In contrast, with materiality the question is simply whether the occur-
rence of the bad event biases the ex post evaluation of a prior warning.73
The hindsight bias directly implicates this kind of judgment. After the ma-
terial event occurs, the warning sign will come to seem like a clear harbin-
ger of the adversity that followed. Numerous studies of the hindsight bias
reveal that knowing the outcome makes the antecedents seem more signifi-
cant than was actually the case."
This distinction between scienter and materiality thus creates a testable
prediction. If the FBH doctrine is an attempt to rid securities litigation of
the hindsight bias, it should play a more important role in assessments of
contingent materiality cases than assessments of scienter. 75  In contrast, if
case management is the true goal of FBH, judges would prefer to attack
claims of scienter. If a court finds that no reasonable inference of scienter
can be made against an individual, the case against that individual ends be-
section of track was reckless. Even though most of the subjects in foresight determined that the
agency was not reckless for keeping the track open, most of the subjects in hindsight found that the
railroad was reckless for using it. Thus, the available evidence at least suggests that the hindsight
bias does influence subjective assessments, such as whether a company was reckless.
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Regulating in Foresight Versus Judging Liability in Hindsight, 33 GA. L. REv.
813, 840-41 (1999) (citing Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 70) (other citations omitted).
72 Also, subjective evaluations are inherently messy and there is reason to expect that other cogni-
tive biases are likely to show up as well. One bias likely to show up is the fundamental attribution error.
The fundamental attribution bias says that people overestimate their ability to predict how another will
act based on their knowledge of that person's character and disposition, underestimating the influence of
situational factors. See Donald C. Langevoort, Taking Myths Seriously: An Essay for Lawyers, 74 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 1569, 1573 (2000). Knowing the outcome evidence, in a sense, gives the judge some in-
formation about the person's character and may bias the judge in her determination (presumably against
the defendant). Cutting against the possible anti-defendant effect is (in what is likely to be a significant
manner) the general bias that judges appear to have, which is that the plaintiffs' lawyers are rascals
bringing frivolous suits and that the corporate managers are just good guys trying to do their jobs. We
have no direct evidence that a number of judges have a jaundiced view of the plaintiffs' lawyers bring-
ing securities case. We make this statement based only on our anecdotal impressions from having read a
number of securities cases and being struck by the frequency with which judges talk about the problem
of strike suits in securities area. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 366
n.28 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (expressing the concern that, after any drop in price, plaintiffs' lawyers will, "with
the benefit of hindsight," file strike suits that are wholly unrelated to the defendants' conduct).
73 See COX ET AL., supra note 62, at 44-52.
74 See Hawkins & Hastie, supra note 12, at 312-16 (reviewing studies).
75 A critic could fault our predictions on the ground that we do not conclusively know that the hind-
sight bias is less of a problem in scienter determinations than in materiality ones. And the critic might
even argue that when the research on scienter-type determinations is done, it might show that the hind-
sight bias is more of a problem in these cases (and that somehow judges have intuited this result through
the process of repeated interactions with these cases). We think that unlikely, but it is possible. Even if
one were to take this extreme position, one would still expect a significant number of materiality appli-
cations because the evidence is clear that the hindsight bias will affect the materiality determination. As
discussed later, the data shows that almost none of the applications of FBH are to materiality determina-
tions; they are all to scienter determinations.
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cause the person lacked the intent to commit fraud. In contrast, the conclu-
sion that a particular event was not material, even contingently material,
only eliminates that particular event as the basis for the materiality prong.
Plaintiffs will likely have identified numerous events that the corporate
managers failed to disclose, alleging all are material. Eliminating the cause
of action requires concluding that none of these events are material. Hence,
from a case management standpoint, a doctrine that can undermine scienter
is more useful than one that can undermine materiality.
As a practical matter, the objective/subjective distinction between ma-
teriality and scienter is artificial. Plaintiffs generally do not have direct evi-
dence going to the defendant's subjective state of mind at the motion to
dismiss stage. The question on scienter thus becomes whether the informa-
tion in question was so obviously important to investors that the failure to
disclose it constituted severe recklessness. That articulation of scienter is
merely a heightened level of materiality: the information was so obviously
important, which is scienter, as opposed to important, which is materiality.
It will be easier to justify a dismissal on scienter grounds because the stan-
dard is higher. Thus, the case management hypothesis predicts that judges
will focus on applying the FBH doctrine to scienter.
While finding a complaint wanting on either grounds is adequate
grounds for dismissal, there is often a difference in the type of dismissal.
Judges often give the defendants leave to replead on the scienter dismissals
because it is harder to say that repleading would be futile.76 The judge
might still find the scienter ruling serves her purposes, however, because
this dismissal does move the case off the docket.
C. Remedying the Hindsight Bias
The hindsight bias persists even when decision-makers are aware of
it.77 Remedying the bias, therefore, requires either limiting the types of de-
cisions courts make or restricting the evidence that a decision-maker has
available. Merely warning of the bias's effects does not reduce its influ-
ence. If the FBH doctrine represents an effort to make unbiased decisions,
then courts will carefully tailor the doctrine to use remedies that are effec-
tive at eliminating the bias.
In other contexts, courts do not rely on mere awareness of the bias as a
remedy. No set of case law supports giving admonitions against the dan-
gers of judging in hindsight, but restrictions on the inference process are
relatively common." For example, in medical malpractice cases, doctors
cannot be found liable for malpractice unless they failed to provide custom-
76 See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434-45 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Ordinar-
ily where a complaint is dismissed on Rule 9(b) 'failure to plead with particularity' grounds alone, leave
to amend is granted." (citations omitted)).
77 See Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 586-88 (reviewing studies).
78 See id. at 607-18 (describing adaptations to the hindsight bias).
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ary medical care. Similarly, in cases involving the issue of whether an in-
vention was obvious and therefore could not be patented, courts do not sim-
ply assess, in hindsight, whether an invention was obvious. Rather, they
make an inquiry into factors concerning the invention that can be assessed
more accurately in hindsight, such as whether the invention satisfied a long-
felt and unresolved need.79 These rules appear designed to correct for the
hindsight bias by keeping judges and juries from inquiring into the quality
of the decision and instead direct attention toward inquiries that can be
made in an unbiased fashion. Courts also restrict certain information, such
as the fact that a tort defendant undertook subsequent remedial measures af-
ter causing the injury, so as not to exacerbate the bias."°
To be sure, it is hard to see how courts could restrict access to outcome
information in securities fraud cases. The courts inevitably confront the
failure of the managers to make accurate forecasts. It is hard to imagine
what a trial would look like if the mistaken forecast were not admissible;
without the mistake, for the most part, there would be no damages and
therefore no case. Courts face a similar problem in torts cases; the judge or
jury inevitably knows that the defendant's level of care failed to protect the
plaintiff from harm. Even though this knowledge might produce some
hindsight bias, such an effect is unavoidable. The judge or juror knows that
she is being asked to evaluate the level of care for a reason; it is not an
"academic exercise."'" Likewise, in securities fraud cases the judge or juror
knows she is there because someone lost money on shares of the defen-
dant's company."
If the FBH doctrine is meant to protect against the hindsight bias, then it
must consist of more than just an admonition against the dangers of judging
in hindsight. It must alter the nature of the inquiry. Courts attempting to de-
bias the system should try to structure the inquiry to assess whether the cor-
porate managers behaved in a manner consistent with corporate managers
who are not committing fraud. Courts could rely on ex ante standards, such
as generally accepted accounting principles or other financial standards. 3
79 See id. at 613-15.
80 See id. at 617-18.
81 David B. Wexler & Robert F. Schopp, How and When To Correct for Juror Hindsight Bias in
Mental Health Malpractice Litigation: Some Preliminary Observations, 7 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 485, 494
(1989) ("[T]he jury will undoubtedly know that they are not being asked simply to engage in an aca-
demic exercise.").
82 In theory, there could be SEC enforcement actions in cases in which there are no monetary losses
for investors (that is, the forecast was erroneous when made, but turns out to be correct because of some
unforeseen positive intervening event), but these do not occur often.
83 As things stand now, there is no ready inventory of ex ante standards to draw from. And part of
the reason for that is that courts have not asked litigants to produce evidence on these standards. One
could imagine expert testimony on the point in a merger discussion at which analysts or brokers begin
recommending that that stock be bought or sold or, if the market reaction is the relevant benchmark, ex-
pert testimony on the question of when the market generally considers merger talks relevant. At that
point, the court could presume materiality. Or, in cases involving intra-quarterly disclosure issues, there
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In contrast, the case management hypothesis predicts a different pat-
tern of responses to the hindsight bias. If courts are merely using the ex-
cuse of hindsight to adjudicate cases as they see fit, then they will adopt a
different approach. Efforts to compare the defendant's conduct to an ex
ante standard, in reality, constrains the power of the decision-maker to ex-
ercise an independent judgment. Reliance on medical custom, for example,
requires that courts refrain from substituting their own judgment for that of
the medical profession. Thus, courts will not pursue such efforts if case
management is their primary goal. Rather, they will identify hindsight as a
problem that justifies active adjudication at an early stage of the proceeding.
In effect, courts might adopt the "admonition" approach to addressing the
hindsight bias as a means of increasing their control over the cases. Ironi-
cally, inasmuch as mere admonition does nothing to reduce the bias, this
approach will give judges more discretion, but will not eliminate the influ-
ence of the bias on outcomes.
D. Reverse Hindsight
If judges are seeking to root the influence of the hindsight bias out of
the system, they will attempt to protect against the bias wherever they find
it. This should include situations in which the hindsight bias might benefit
defendants in securities cases-which is the reverse of the usual tendency
of the bias to benefit plaintiffs.84 Once a bad event occurs, the evaluation of
a warning that was given earlier will be biased. In terms of evaluating a de-
cision-maker's failure to heed a warning, knowledge that the warned-of
outcome occurred will increase the salience of the warning in the evalua-
tor's mind and bias her in the direction of finding fault with the failure to
heed the warning. In effect, the hindsight bias becomes an "I-told-you-so"
bias.
Securities cases contain such an "I told you so" issue, formally referred
to as "bespeaks caution."5 Case law indicates that the materiality of for-
ward-looking statements must be evaluated in light of warnings or caution-
could be expert testimony on the question as to the point in an ongoing quarter at which preliminary re-
suits become interesting to analysts. For a discussion of a handful of instances where courts have at-
tempted to look to external indications of the type discussed, see infra note 125.
84 By reverse hindsight, we thus mean to refer to situations in which the bias benefits plaintiffs. We
do not mean to refer to any reversal of the hindsight bias in which the outcome seems less predictable
after it happens. A couple of researchers have claimed to have found such reversals, but these reversals
have been debunked. See Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 580 n.31 (describing both the alleged reversals
and the reasons the criticisms of these studies).
85 For discussions of this doctrine, see Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that "Bespeak Caution
49 Bus. LAW. 481 (1994), and Jennifer O'Hare, Good Faith and the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine: It's
Not Just a State of Mind, 58 U. PITT. L. REv. 619, 630 (1997). Among the problems with the bespeaks
caution doctrine, one of us identified a hindsight bias problem in an article from some years ago:
"Courts pass judgment ... knowing that this particular reliance was indeed unwise. In hindsight, it is
easy to find fault with reliance on self-interested others." Langevoort, supra, at 494.
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ary statements made by the defendants prior to the release of the bad news. 6
That is, defendants commonly include warnings or cautionary notes with
their forecasts and predictions that suggest that the company's future might
not be so rosy. Once a bad outcome occurs, these warnings will seem more
important than they seemed when they were made. This tendency is similar
to that of contingent information that was not disclosed; in foresight, man-
agers might reasonably believe that the contingency was too unlikely to
merit disclosure, whereas in hindsight it seems obvious a reasonable inves-
tor would have wanted to know it. Likewise, as to warnings a company ac-
tually made, in foresight most investors might reasonably ignore them,
whereas in hindsight they seem profoundly important. If defendants are al-
lowed to defend themselves by arguing that a reasonable investor would
have attended closely to these warnings, then the hindsight bias might bene-
fit defendants.
If judges are engaged in a serious effort to rid securities cases of the
hindsight bias, then they will make efforts to account for the hindsight bias
in assessments of whether cautionary language should justify dismissal of a
securities fraud claim. Judges seeking to debias the system should be con-
cerned about how these problems might adversely affect the plaintiff.
In contrast, the extensive use of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine and
the failure to accommodate the concerns raised by the hindsight bias in ap-
plication of this doctrine would support the case management hypothesis.87
Adopting measures to guard against defendants' ability to take advantage of
the hindsight bias would make it harder for judges to dismiss a case,
thereby undermining judge's ability to decide cases as they see fit. Hence,
if case management dominates judicial thinking in securities cases, then we
should not expect to see the use of such measures in the application of the
bespeaks caution doctrine.
86 See, e.g., Stavroff v. Meyo, No. 95-4118, 1997 WL 720475, at *5 (6th Cir. Nov. 12, 1997) ("To
determine whether statements fall under the bespeaks caution doctrine, we review the statements in con-
text and examine the 'total mix' of information available to the reasonable investor." (citations omit-
ted)).
87 The following hypothetical should help illustrate how the doctrine applies: Company Xis highly
dependent on its CEO (for example, Martha Stewart's company). Three months ago, the company did a
public offering of securities. In that context, the company put out the following statement: "We are op-
timistic that our CEO will lead us to produce consistent increases in revenues and stock prices over the
next decade." A month ago, it was revealed that the CEO had suffered a massive coronary and had re-
signed her position. The company's stock price tanks and the disgruntled shareholders sue. They say
the company misled them with its optimistic statement about increasing revenues over the next decade
into believing that the CEO was healthy. The court, however, finds a cautionary statement in the pro-
spectus (one of many) that says: "Our financial viability is highly dependent on the health of our CEO
and we can make no guarantees as to her continued good health." Reasonable investors, the court says,
would have read the company's optimistic statement in light of the warning about health risks and would
have appropriately discounted it to the point of making it immaterial.
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E. Evolutionary Path
Implicit in both the debiasing and case management theories is a sub-
story about evolution of the doctrine. Doctrine evolves as judges learn from
their experiences and those of their colleagues. Under the debiasing hy-
pothesis, the doctrine should evolve toward a better application of the pro-
tection against the hindsight bias as judges learn from experience how to
structure the proceedings to produce more accurate outcomes. Over time,
judges should learn which reforms will facilitate their ability to sort fraud
from mere mistake. Under the case management hypothesis, however, the
doctrine should slowly expand to make it easier for judges to dispose of
cases. If the FBH doctrine is merely a pretense for aggressively disposing
of cases early in the process, then the doctrine should simply spread over
time, without much refinement.
F. Summary of the Distinctions
The following table summarizes the predictions from the two stories.
TABLE 1: DISTINGUISHING DEBIASING FROM CASE MANAGEMENT
PREDICTIONS: PREDICTIONS:
THE DEBIASING THE CASE
HYPOTHESIS MANAGEMENT
HYPOTHESIS
1. Stage of the litigation Summary judgment Judgment on the
at which courts apply or trial pleadings
the FBH doctrine
2. Elements of securities Materiality determina- Determinations of
fraud to which courts tions of contingent scienter
apply the FBH doctrine information
3. The form that the Efforts to find ex ante Admonitions against
FBH doctrine takes customs or standards allowing the bias to
affect judgment
4. Reverse hindsight Courts will make Courts will only
efforts to remedy the attempt to remedy the
adverse effects of the doctrine so as to help
bias on plaintiffs defendants
5. Pattern of evolution Doctrine will evolve Doctrine will evolve
of the FBH doctrine over time into a better over time toward
correction for the creating more discretion
problem of hindsight for judges
bias
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III. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FBH DOCTRINE
As a preliminary step toward testing the competing hypotheses, we
identify the historical development of the doctrine. The originators of the
FBH doctrine were Judges Henry Friendly and Frank Easterbrook. Judges
Friendly and Easterbrook are among the most prominent business-law
judges of the past century.88 Their description of the FBH doctrine is there-
fore critical to understanding the doctrine.
A. The Origin: Judge Friendly Utters the Magic Words
The doctrine originates in 1978 with Judge Friendly's opinion in
Denny v. Barber."9 As with many of the early cases applying the FBH doc-
trine, Denny involved a bank and loans that turned out badly. As part of a
securities fraud claim against the bank, plaintiffs alleged that the bank had
engaged in unsound lending practices, maintained insufficient loan loss re-
serves, delayed writing off bad loans, and undertaken speculative invest-
ments. The fraud allegedly arose from the bank's failure to disclose these
problems in reports issued in 1973 and early 1974, when it had instead is-
sued an optimistic report on conditions. The plaintiffs alleged that the bank
hid these problems until it issued a report discussing the problems in late
1974.9" The defendants brought a motion to dismiss on the pleadings that
the district court granted. Plaintiffs appealed the order and that brought the
case before a Second Circuit panel that included Judge Friendly.
Judge Friendly ruled that merely identifying the disclosure in late 1974
was inadequate to show that the defendants had the requisite state of mind
in 1973 and early 1974. He wrote:
In sum, the complaint is an example of alleging fraud by hindsight. For the
most part, plaintiff has simply seized upon disclosures made in later reports
and alleged that they should have been made in earlier ones. While greater
88 Judge Easterbrook, along with his frequent coauthor, Professor Dan Fischel, has written a number
of the most important articles in the corporate and securities law areas. For a collection, see FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991). In ad-
dition, Judge Easterbrook is the author of a number of the most prominent securities cases such as
Weilgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., Pommer v. Medtest, and Jordan v. Duff & Phelps Inc-cases
that find their way into a number of the leading casebooks in the area. See, e.g., COX ET AL., supra note
62, at 54, 755 (including Jordan and Weilgos); WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
462, 660 (5th ed. 2003) (including Pommer and Jordan), MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION
757 (3d ed. 1998) (including Weilgos). For a measurement of judicial influence that shows Judge
Easterbrook as outstripping his current colleagues on the appellate bench (with the exception of Judge
Richard Posner), see Mitu Gulati & Veronica Sanchez, Giants in a World of Pygmies? Testing the Su-
perstar Hypothesis with Judicial Opinions in Casebooks, 87 IOWA L. REv. 1141 (2002). On Judge
Friendly and his influence on the development of securities law, see Margaret Sachs, Judge Friendly
and the Law of Securities Regulation: The Creation of a Judicial Reputation, 50 SMU L. REv. 777
(1997).
89 576 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1978).
90 See id. at 467.
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clairvoyance in 1973 might have led to a realization that [certain loans and in-
vestments were not wise] ... failure to make such perceptions does not consti-
tute fraud. Nowhere does the complaint allege with the required particularity
transactions about which defendants in fact had such perceptions or were reck-
less in not having them when the 1973 and early 1974 reports were issued.9"
Important to understanding this outcome is Judge Friendly's discussion
of intervening events. Only a few sentences after using the term "fraud by
hindsight," Judge Friendly explained that this was a case in which there
were a number of intervening events, such as the dramatic increase in petro-
leum prices in the early 1970s and the City of New York's financial crisis.92
These events were not specific to the bank, which clearly had no greater
ability to predict them than the general public. Thus, Judge Friendly was
probably not concerned with the hindsight bias per se. Instead, he was con-
cerned with the plaintiffs' use of a general change in the business climate as
a basis for a securities fraud claim.
Indeed, the facts of Denny make it an unlikely candidate for influence
by the hindsight bias. As discussed, the bias works largely because learning
the outcome leads people to make secondary inferences about the underly-
ing facts. When events that cause the outcome have no connection to the
antecedent events, observers learn nothing from the outcome that would
lead them to view the antecedents any differently.93 For example, in one
study of the hindsight bias, when people were told that the outcome of a
war was determined by a freak snowstorm, rather than to one of the innate
advantages of one side or the other, they did not overstate their ability to
have predicted the outcome.94 In the case of Denny, learning that the bank
suffered financial problems as a result of high oil prices and a potential mu-
nicipal bankruptcy teaches people a lot about the American economy, but
not so much about this particular bank or its lending practices. Despite
Judge Friendly's reference to hindsight, the case is probably not one in
which the hindsight bias would play much of a role.
Judge Friendly's phrase, "fraud by hindsight," attracted little attention
over the next decade. The phrase appears only eighteen times in published
opinions in securities cases over the next eleven years.95 The courts that
used Judge Friendly's language in that period largely remained faithful to
the point he was making. That is, that hindsight alone might not constitute
91 Id. at 470.
92 Id.
93 See Hawkins & Hastie, supra note 12, at 313.
94 David Wasserman et al., Hindsight and Causality, 17 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 30
(1991).
95 The phrase was not cited elsewhere in 1978 or in 1979. It appears once in 1980; not at all in
1981; twice in 1982; once in 1983; twice in 1984; twice in 1985; four times in 1986; once in 1987; not at
all in 1988; and four times in 1989. The phrase then appears three times in 1990, including in DiLeo v.
Ernst & Young, which we discuss in more detail infra Part III.B. These results were obtained with a
Westlaw search of the ALLFEDS database.
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a sufficient demonstration that the defendants made some predictive deci-
sion with knowledge of its falsity or something close to it. Unlike Denny,
however, it does not appear that any of these cases had intervening events
outside the control of the managers (or, even if there were such events, the
judges did not flag them).
B. The Doctrine Expands: Judge Easterbrook ' Contribution
Judge Easterbrook's use of the phrase "fraud by hindsight" in DiLeo v.
Ernst & Young96 in 1990 produced a much greater impact on securities law
than Denny. Once Judge Easterbrook articulated the FBH doctrine in
DiLeo, courts immediately began to recite it in securities cases with fre-
quency, as Figure 1, below, demonstrates. Whereas the phrase was cited
only about twice per year before DiLeo, this rose to an average of nearly
twenty-seven times per year afterwards.97 A portion of this increased usage
of FBH can probably be explained by the roughly three-fold increase in the
number of securities class actions that were filed. But the fact that the pro-
portional increase in FBH usage was much larger (thirteen-fold as com-
pared to three-fold) suggests that Judge Easterbrook's articulation may have
had a strong independent effect on the increased usage.98 More important
though, as we explain later in this subpart, reading the cases reveals that it
is Easterbrook's articulation of FBH that gets picked up by the subsequent
cases rather than that of Friendly. Judge Friendly coined the phrase, but
Judge Easterbrook gave it life.
96 901 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1990).
97 The phrase appears 296 times between 1992 and 2002, inclusive. Dividing 296 by 11 produces
an average of 26.9 citations per year.
98 See Class Action Reports, Statistics, at http://www.classactionreports.com/classactionreports/
stats4.htm (reporting data on annual filings of securities class actions).
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FIGURE 1: CITATIONS TO THE PHRASE "FRAUD BY HINDSIGHT"
BETWEEN 1978 AND 2002 IN PUBLISHED OPINIONS
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Like Denny, DiLeo involved problems with loans; problems that the
defendants failed to disclose. Bank shareholders brought a securities fraud
action against the bank's accountants. They alleged that the bank's non-
performing loans had increased regularly over time, and so should have the
reserves established for those loans. They also contended that the bank and
its accountants had known and failed to disclose that a substantial portion of
the bank's loans were uncollectible.99 In affirming the district court's dis-
missal of the complaint, Judge Easterbrook wrote the following:
The story in this complaint is familiar in securities litigation. At one time the
firm bathes itself in a favorable light. Later the firm discloses that things are
less rosy. The plaintiff contends that the difference must be attributable to
fraud. "Must be" is the critical phrase, for the complaint offers no information
other than the differences between the two statements of the firm's condition.
Because only a fraction of financial deteriorations reflect fraud, plaintiffs may
not proffer the differential financial statements and rest .... Rule 9(b) re-
quired the district court to dismiss the complaint, which discloses none of the
circumstances that might separate fraud from the benefit of hindsight. There is
no "fraud by hindsight", in Judge Friendly's felicitous phrase, Denny, 576 at
470, and hindsight is all the DiLeos offer10°
Judge Easterbrook begins by articulating something close to what
Judge Friendly had said in Denny. Specifically, the fact that the loans
99 DiLeo, 901 F.2d at 627.
100 Id. at 627-28.
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turned out badly does not mean that the defendants knew (or should have
known) that this was going to happen. Judge Easterbrook, however, said
more. He not only said that the hindsight evidence was inadequate, but also
talked about the kind of evidence that plaintiffs must have presented to sat-
isfy Rule 9(b)'s requirement that fraud be pled with particularity-
contemporaneous evidence.'' Judge Easterbrook's oft-quoted admonition
is that that plaintiffs need to plead the "what, where, when, and how" of the
allegedly fraudulent statements. 102
Judge Easterbrook thus moves beyond Judge Friendly in two important
respects. First, he not only says that hindsight evidence is inadequate, but
suggests that what is needed is contemporaneous evidence.' 3 Second, while
Judge Friendly merely said that the hindsight evidence in that case was in-
adequate because of certain big intervening events, Judge Easterbrook takes
the position that hindsight evidence should not be used as a general matter.
Judge Easterbrook makes the empirical claim that "only a fraction of business
reverses are attributable to fraud," which leads up to his statement that "de-
fendants must point to some facts suggesting that the difference [in the past
statement and current results] is attributable to fraud."'" The plaintiffs, he
tells us, must provide the court with evidence that enables it to "separate" the
cases with mere hindsight from those where there is fraud. The implication is
that hindsight-only cases are not fraud cases and that the judge's task is to
separate the two categories of cases: hindsight (bad cases that should be dis-
missed) and real fraud (good cases that should be allowed to proceed).
But why did Judge Easterbrook's articulation of the FBH doctrine at-
tract more attention from subsequent courts than Judge Friendly's articula-
tion? Perhaps Judge Easterbrook's articulation was broader and easier to
apply. Judge Friendly found the hindsight evidence problematic because of
a specific and idiosyncratic set of conditions. Judge Easterbrook's articula-
tion of the FBH doctrine makes hindsight evidence problematic as a general
matter, thereby removing the need for a fact-specific inquiry to determine
whether to dismiss a case. 5
101 As we discuss later, FBH in its early forms appears to have been the forerunner of the Second
Circuit's heightened pleading requirements regarding the state of mind element in fraud cases. This
heightened pleading requirement was later codified (and some say heightened even further) by Congress
in the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. On the debate over the heightened pleading stan-
dard, see Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185 (1st Cir. 1999).
102 Judge Easterbrook also described this as "the first paragraph of any newspaper story." DiLeo,
901 F.2d at 627.
103 The need for an ex ante perspective in analyzing securities cases is one that Easterbrook has em-
phasized on other occasions. In other oft-quoted language, he has said, "an inability to foresee the future
does not constitute fraud because 'the securities laws approach matters from an ex ante perspective."'
Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1132 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Pommer v. Medtest Corp.,
961 F. 2d 620, 623 (7th Cir. 1992)).
104 DiLeo, 901 F.2d at 627.
105 A different simplifying empirical assumption by Judge Easterbrook in DiLeo, that accounting
firms tend to behave rationally, has also been cited frequently by other courts. See Robert A. Prentice,
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The popularity of Judge Easterbrook's articulation of the FBH doctrine
also supports the case management hypothesis over the debiasing hypothe-
sis for two reasons. First, on the face of it, Judge Easterbrook's articulation
is not consistent with the problems hindsight raises. Judge Easterbrook de-
clares that "[t]here is no 'fraud by hindsight'." This articulation denies that
a bad outcome is even relevant to the matter of fraud at the pleadings stage.
In contrast, Judge Friendly asserted that the plaintiffs in Denny had relied
only on hindsight, which he found inconsistent with FRCP 9(b)'s insistence
upon particularity. He did not assert that the hindsight is irrelevant to the
existence of fraud, merely that hindsight alone is not enough to sustain a
complaint. As discussed above,"0 6 Judge Easterbrook is wrong about this-
the existence of an inaccurate assessment of the business is relevant to
whether fraud has occurred. The statement is inconsistent with the concept
that the FBH doctrine is meant to identify and eliminate the effect of the
bias. Yet it is this inaccurate version of the doctrine that the judiciary ulti-
mately finds compelling.
Second, Judge Easterbrook's articulation of the problem invited courts
to engage in aggressive policing of complaints. Judge Easterbrook's quote
about the inadequacy of hindsight evidence began: "The story of this com-
plaint is familiar in securities litigation." This suggested that the danger of
hindsight is greater in securities class action cases, and therefore courts
must more rigorously scrutinize the basis for the allegations.' Further, he
indicated that complaints in securities fraud cases fall into two categories:
cases that reference little more than hindsight in support of the allegations
of fraud, and cases that identify contemporaneous evidence of fraud. This
distinction facilitates the judicial role in adjudicating cases solely on the
complaint.' Judge Easterbrook urged his colleagues to use their own
The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L.
REV. 133, 136-41 (2000) (criticizing Easterbrook's assumption that auditors behave rationally); see also
Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 49 n.228
(2003) (justifying Easterbrook's analysis and criticizing Prentice, in part, on the grounds of a need for a
correction against the hindsight bias).
106 See supra Part II.A.
107 Even if Judge Easterbrook did not intend this meaning, other courts have interpreted him in this
manner. For example, in setting out the particularity requirements under Rule 9(b) for a securities plain-
tiff, the court in Shields v. NCNB Corp., said:
As explained by other courts, in the area of securities violations, Rule 9(b) requires greater speci-
ficity as to the fraud than may be required in other suits. The greater specificity is appropriate and
necessary because of the potential for abuse of a strike suit brought for its in terrorem effect.
No. C-90-0090, 1991 WL 146854, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 28, 1991) (citations omitted).
108 It is worth noting that Judge Friendly expressed similar concerns about frivolous securities fil-
ings in Denny. In justifying requiring more in the way of evidence than vague allegations, Judge
Friendly explained:
The Supreme Court has admonished that to the extent that such discovery [that would be permitted
if the plaintiffs were to get beyond the motion to dismiss] 'permits a plaintiff with a largely
groundless claim to simply take up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so
representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement value, rather than a reasonably founded
98:773 (2004)
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judgment to identify cases that are likely to rely solely on hindsight to sup-
port the allegations of fraud.
IV. EMPIRICAL SUMMARY OF THE FBH CASES 1N THE POST-DILEO
PERIOD
The discussion that follows describes our findings about the state of the
FBH doctrine. We present the evidence used to test the two competing hy-
potheses on the nature of the FBH doctrine. For the most part, we restrict
our analysis to the post-DiLeo period because the doctrine expanded so
dramatically after Judge Easterbrook's reformulation.
A. Basic Data
Our source of data was the Westlaw database, where we examined the
population of published opinions on securities class action cases.109 We
conducted a search for the term "fraud by hindsight" in every year from
1978 forward in the ALLFEDS database. To compare the FBH cases to
those that do not use the term, we also generated a database of opinions in
securities fraud class actions that do not use the phrase. This was also done
by searching the ALLFEDS database from 1978 to the end of 2002."'
hope that the process will reveal relevant evidence, it is a social cost rather than a benefit.'
Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975)).
109 This is a more expansive definition of "published opinion" than is ordinarily used; ordinarily, the
term is only used for those opinions that the judges designate as "for publication." The reason for our
usage is that we were interested in estimating the level of use of the doctrine and we would have under-
counted use levels had we left out the "not for publication" ("NFP") opinions. There is a problem here,
however, in that there are some circuits that do not place their NFPs online, or have only begun doing so
recently. Hence, to the extent there are a number of FBH cases in these NFPs, we have undercounted
and possibly biased the data. See Johanna S. Schiavoni, Who 's Afraid of Precedent? The Debate over
the Precedential Value of Opiniors, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1859, 1861 n.8 (2002) (reporting that the Third,
Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits limit placement of certain opinions on the online data bases). For more de-
tail on publication practices, see Melissa M. Serfass & Jessie L. Cranford, Federal and State Court
Rules Governing Publication and Citation of Opinions, 3 J. APp. PRAC. & PROCESS 251, 253 & tbl.1
(2001).
110 Although the FBH doctrine is used almost exclusively in the securities fraud context, a Westlaw
search revealed a handful of cases in other settings. The search was conducted in both the state and fed-
eral case databases on Westlaw. Cases involving 9(b) outside the securities litigation setting include:
Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir. 1999) (asserting that FBH
claims do not satisfy Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirements); United States v. Graham County Soil &
Water Conservation Dist., No. 2:01CV19, 2002 WL 487162, at *11 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 5, 2002) (explain-
ing, in the context of a case under the False Claims Act, that "fraud by hindsight does not satisfy Rule
9(b)"); Little v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 243 F. Supp. 2d 480, 505 (D.S.C. 2001) (explain-
ing, in the context of alleging misleading advertising about the risks of smoking, that claims of fraud
must satisfy Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirements and FBH claims do not satisfy these); In re Grady L.
Wicker, No. 99-07108, 2000 WL 33709668, at *3, n.3 (D.S.C. May 23, 2000) (same, but in a Chapter 7
bankruptcy case); Glen Holly Entm't, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (same, Califor-
nia law fraud case); Nepomoceno v. Knights of Columbus, No. Civ.A.96C4789, 1999 WL 66570, at *13
(N.D. I1. Feb. 8, 1999) (rejecting, in an insurance fraud case, defendants' 9(b) argument and holding
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The data suffer from an incompleteness problem arising from reliance
on published opinions. The dispositions in our sample are those available
online. There are likely a number of dispositions (especially at the district
court level) in which judges have chosen not to put their opinions online.
The question, for our purposes, is whether a large number of unpublished,
yet influential, dispositions exist. We suspect that this is unlikely because
at least one of the parties to a complex securities case, along with the judge,
would be motivated to ensure that an important securities opinion received
publication. Of greater concern to us is that the likelihood of publication
interacts in some important way with our hypotheses. While we cannot
know for sure, we do not see reason to expect a large number of unpub-
lished decisions on the merits of any kind in these cases.
Table 2 shows the percent of class action securities cases invoking
FBH, from 1991 to the present (after DiLeo). The phrase has appeared in
roughly 20 to 30 percent of all securities class action opinions. Although
the raw numbers of cases using the phrase have increased, the percentage of
opinions using it has remained roughly constant since the publication of
DiLeo. The passage of the PSLRA did not affect the percentage of cases
that use the doctrine.
that the purpose of 9(b) is to give adequate notice to an adverse party); De Jesus v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., No. 93Civ.2605, 1995 WL 122726, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 1995) (claims must satisfy Rule 9(b)'s
particularity requirements, ERISA case); United States v. Planning Research Group, No. 92-1951, 1994
WL 118222, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 1994) (same, False Claims Act case); Hewlett v. Hewlett Packard
Co., No. CIV.A.19513, 2002 WL 549137, at *11 (Del. Ch. Apr. 8, 2002) (rejecting, in the context of a
merger case involving alleged misrepresentations producing claims under state law, defendants' argu-
ment that plaintiffs had done no more than plead FBH); Lewis v. Austen, No. C.A.12937, 1999 WL
378125, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 2, 1999) (rejecting, for lack of contemporaneous evidence, plaintiffs' re-
quest that court infer, from the fact that merger occurred, that preliminary discussions had taken place
some months prior). Seven of the ten are unpublished dispositions.
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TABLE 2: PREVALENCE OF THE FBH DOCTRINE IN PUBLISHED
OPINIONS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CASES"'
Year Number of Total Number of Percent of
Opinions Opinions Opinions using
Using FBH (securities fraud FBH
class actions)
1991 24 70 34%
1992 22 66 33%
1993 22 65 34%
1994 15 58 26%
1995 26 74 35%
1996 19 76 25%
1997 18 81 22%
1998 19 79 24%
1999 25 94 27%
2000 42 111 37%
2001 39 139 27%
2002 49 184 27%
Total 320 1097 29%
Note: From 1978 to 1990, there were 21 opinions with FBH.
Table 3 breaks the data down further to identify the defendants' win
rates when FBH is invoked versus when it is not mentioned. The ledger
tilts significantly (both practically and statistically) in the defendants' favor
for every one of the ten years between 1991 and 2000 (Column 4 versus
Column 2).12 Overall, the win rate for the defendants since DiLeo in FBH
cases is 70 percent, as compared with 47 percent in those cases that did not
mention it-a statistically significant difference. "'
I These data do not allow for a sensible comparison of district courts with appellate courts. Un-
fortunately, there are not enough circuit court cases to make a meaningful comparison on a per-year ba-
sis. In the ten years between 1992 and 2001, there were thirty circuit court cases in our population of
FBH (as compared to 200-plus district court cases). Defendants won in eighteen out of these thirty, a 60
percent victory rate that is lower than the defendant-win rates in the district courts for all but two of
these years. So, overall, the defendant win rate in FBH cases appears lower at the circuit court level.
Given the low number of circuit court cases, however, we are reluctant to make much of this.
112 The percentage differences are large enough to easily satisfy standard statistical significance
tests (with z statistics well above 2 for almost all the differences). On the relevant calculations to be
made, see DAVID FREEDMAN ET AL., STATISTICs 508 (3d ed. 1998).
113 p < .001, using Fisher's exact z.
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TABLE 3: THE FBH DOCTRINE & DEFENDANT SUCCESS RATE
Year FBH Cases In Securities Difference
Class Action (columns 2 and 3)
Opinions not
using FBH
1987 - 31% -
1988 - 31% -
1989 - 46% -
1990 - 32% -
1991 71% 43% +28
1992 64% 47% +17
1993 68% 42% +24
1994 67% 51% +16
1995 85% 54% +31
1996 53% 44% +9
1997 78% 51% +27
1998 63% 53% +10
1999 72% 49% +23
2000 76% 41% +35
2001 58% 45% +13
2002 80% 46% +34
Overall 70% 47% +23
(Post DiLeo)
B. Timing and Win-Loss Rates
As Table 4 demonstrates, over 90 percent of the FBH opinions involve
determinations at the motion to dismiss stage, while fewer than 10 percent
occur in summary judgment proceedings. The problem with this skew,
however, is that it makes it difficult to make meaningful comparisons be-
tween the win-loss rates on the cases decided at the pleadings versus those
at the summary judgment stage (the number of cases at the latter stage be-
ing so few). As noted earlier, the invocation of FBH by a court seems to be
a positive sign for the defendants because they win in 70 percent of the
cases (as compared to fewer than 50 percent in the non-FBH cases). The
key observation here, however, is that the majority of applications of the
FBH doctrine occur at the motion to dismiss stage and not at either sum-
mary judgment or some later stage.
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TABLE 4: TIMING AND WIN-LOSS RATES FOR CASES APPLYING FBH
Defendant Win Rate
Year Percent Pleadings Summary Judgment
1991 (24) 8.3 72.7 (22) 50.0 (2)
1992(22) 4.6 66.7(21) 0.0(1)
1993 (22) 9.1 65.0 (20) 100.0 (2)
1994 (15) 20.0 58.3 (12) 100.0 (3)
1995 (26) 11.5 82.6 (23) 100.0 (3)
1996(19) 21.1 53.3 (15) 50.0(4)
1997(18) 11.1 81.3(16) 50.0(2)
1998 (19) 0.0 63.2 (19)
1999 (25) 0.0 72.0 (25)
2000 (42) 4.9 74.4 (40) 100.0 (2)
2001 (39) 2.6 58.0 (38) 100.0 (1)
2002 (49) 2.0 80.0 (48) 100.0 (1)
All > '90 7.0 70.0 (299) 75.0 (21)
The question, however, is whether the use of the doctrine on pleadings
is something unusual, or merely the general pattern in securities class action
cases. As one securities casebook notes, in securities cases, "if the class is
certified and the defendant's pre-discovery motions are denied, [the case]
will almost certainly be settled."' 4 To answer that question, we compared
the fraction of summary judgment determinations in FBH cases to those in
non-FBH securities cases over the most recent five years. For each year,
the fraction of summary judgment determinations in the non-FBH cases,
while low, was higher than that in the FBH cases. Overall, only 3 percent
(5/192) of the FBH determinations occurred at the summary judgment
stage, whereas the corresponding number for non-FBH securities cases was
12 percent (60/498), a statistically significant difference." 5
114 Cox ET AL., supra note 62, at 734.
115 p < .001, by Fisher's exact z.
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TABLE 5: PLEADINGS VERSUS SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FBH AND
OTHER SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTION CASES
Year Percent of SJ determinations in Percent of SJ determinations in
FBH cases non-FBH cases
(total number of FBH cases) (total number of non-FBH cases)
1997 11.1 (18) 12.9 (63)
1998 0.0 (19) 10.0 (80)
1999 0.0 (25) 18.3 (60)
2000 2.4 (42) 7.2 (69)
2001 2.6(39) 12.8(101)
2002 2.0(49) 11.9(135)
C. The Different Applications of the FBH Doctrine
Courts apply FBH doctrine in at least three different ways: to scienter
determinations; to materiality determinations; and in non-specific ways-as a
garnish to the discussion. Initially, we coded the cases based on the section
of the opinion in which the reference to FBH appeared. If it appeared in the
scienter section of the opinion, we coded that case as a scienter application; if
in the materiality portion, it was coded as materiality; if in a preliminary
statement about the applicable evidentiary burdens in a securities case or in a
conclusory statement about the kind of case, we coded the case as garnish.
Our initial coding indicated that approximately 60 percent of the applications
were to scienter, 35 percent to materiality, and the remainder garnish. Scruti-
nizing the text of the applications (our secondary coding), however, reveals
that over 98 percent of the applications of the FBH doctrine involved discus-
sions of scienter. Typically, the reason why the application of the FBH doc-
trine to scienter occurred in a non-scienter section of the opinion was that the
judge was connecting his or her analysis of scienter to either the discussion of
materiality or her conclusion about the case as a whole. In sum, the courts
overwhelmingly apply the FBH doctrine to determinations of scienter, rather
than to determinations of materiality.
Materiality is typically a central issue in a securities disclosure case. A
significant portion of these disclosure cases involve contingent or unripe in-
formation that plaintiffs say should have been revealed earlier. Indeed,
every attack on a forecast that turned out wrong involves an implicit asser-
tion that the defendants had preliminary and material information at the
time of the forecast that indicated that the forecast was unreasonable at the
time made."1 6 The point here is to draw a rough comparison between the
116 This is because the attack that a plaintiff is allowed to make on a forecast is that it was unreason-
able when made. See Glassman v. Computervision, 90 F.3d 617, 627 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[W]hile forecasts
are not actionable merely because they do not come true, they may be actionable because they are not
reasonably based on, or are inconsistent with, the facts at the time the forecast is made.").
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number of FBH scienter and materiality cases. All of the former (which
were either forecast or contingent information cases) involve the latter ques-
tion as well. The hindsight bias should therefore affect both determinations
in every case. Yet, we see FBH invoked almost exclusively in scienter de-
terminations.
D. The Substance of the FBH Doctrine
Thus far, our analysis of the FBH doctrine has been confined to a so-
cial science approach. We have described the doctrine in numeric, rather
than substantive, terms. In this section, we present a more traditional, legal
analysis of the cases. We assess how courts describe the doctrine. We then
present a puzzle that arises from how the courts actually apply the doctrine,
which differs markedly from the courts' assertions as to the doctrine's
meaning.
1. What the Courts Say the FBH Doctrine Means.-What is it that
the courts are saying when they say that plaintiffs may not plead fraud by
hindsight? Courts seem to indicate that the FBH doctrine is designed to
prevent reliance on a bad outcome as a basis for an allegation of fraud. The
Second Circuit's opinion in Novak v. Kasaks sets out the standard language
on FBH, which is:
[W]e have identified several important limitations on the scope of liability for
securities fraud based on reckless conduct. First, we have refused to allow
plaintiffs to proceed with allegations of "fraud by hindsight." Corporate offi-
cials need not be clairvoyant; they are only responsible for revealing those ma-
terial facts reasonably available to them. Thus, allegations that defendants
should have anticipated future events and made certain disclosures earlier than
they actually did do not suffice to make out a claim of securities fraud." 7
The court describes the FBH doctrine as a "limitation" on the scope of li-
ability and then says the Circuit does not permit plaintiffs to proceed using
allegations of "fraud by hindsight.""' 8  Taken together, these statements
must mean that corporate managers are not liable merely because the future
of their company turned out to be less rosy than they had predicted. The al-
legation of a failed forecast does not, by itself, constitute a specific allega-
tion of fraud, necessary to satisfy Rule 9(b). Even though such allegations
can be quite specific, the courts, citing the FBH doctrine, say this is not
enough. Courts explicitly assert that the law "prohibits" pleading fraud by
hindsight.'
117 Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 309 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
118 For other examples of courts discussing FBH as a "limitation" on the scope of liability for secu-
rities fraud, see City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Companies, 265 F.3d 1245, 1260 (10th Cir. 2001), and
In re Mercator Software, Inc. Securities Litigation, 161 F. Supp. 2d 143, 149 (D. Conn. 2001).
119 See Gross v. Summa Four, Inc., 93 F.3d 987, 991 (1st Cir. 1996); Meyer v. Biopure Corp., 221
F. Supp. 2d 195 n.1 (D. Mass 2002).
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The FBH doctrine does not alter how courts can analyze the relation-
ship between a bad outcome and the likelihood of fraud, but whether they
can do so. If the FBH doctrine were some sort of guide as to how to con-
duct an unbiased assessment of the relationship between a bad outcome and
the likelihood that fraud occurred, then the cases would look different.
Courts would assess the evidence in context, including the outcome, and
sometimes conclude that there was not enough to produce the required in-
ference.2 0 Instead, the courts set up the FBH doctrine as a limitation or
prohibition on the type of pleading that is allowed in all securities fraud
cases.
The handful of cases that discuss the problem of evaluating materiality
in hindsight are somewhat more explicit about their concern with allowing
allegations based solely on bad outcomes. As one court noted: "Hindsight
is always 20/20. 'The probability of a transaction occurring must be con-
sidered in light of the facts as they then existed, not with the hindsight
knowledge that the transaction was or was not completed.' 1 2 ' Another
court remarked that, "[i]n assessing whether a misrepresentation or omis-
sion was material, courts may not employ 20/20 hindsight; instead, they
must consider whether the misrepresentation or omission was material on
the date the prospectus or registration statement was issued.'
' 2
In some cases, judges explicitly allow a pleading based largely on the
outcome, in spite of the FBH doctrine. These cases provide a different view
of how judges assess the barriers to using outcomes to support pleadings of
fraud. Judges in these cases always articulate a need to explain either why
their case is an exception to the general rule or why the rule is not really a
rule. For example, one recent Third Circuit panel circumvented the FBH
doctrine and allowed the plaintiffs the benefit of hindsight evidence. The
120 One possibility is that what the courts are saying is that hindsight evidence is never enough "by
itself' to produce the requisite inference; there are courts that explicitly use this language. See, e.g., In
re Sprint Corp. Sec. Litig., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1226 (D. Kan. 2002); In re MCI Worldcom Inc., Sec.
Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 778, 789 (S.D. Miss. 2002). As a logical matter, that cannot be right. After all, if
one makes the time difference between the outcome and the time at which the prior state of mind needs
to be determined short enough, a very high level inference can be produced in a number of contexts. For
example, if a company announces today that its CEO is resigning because of difference with the other
members of the board, one can be almost certain that the company knew of this information five minutes
prior. Indeed, one can be fairly certain that there was knowledge of the disputes a week prior or even a
month prior. There are a host of such examples that one can spin out-with disclosures of bad quarterly
results or product failures-all of them involving precisely the types of failures to disclose that are rou-
tinely at the center of a securities disclosure case and all of them involving hindsight evidence that could
produce a very high inference of prior knowledge on the part of the defendant. Strict logic aside though,
perhaps the courts are making an approximation given the types of hindsight evidence that they are typi-
cally presented with (which is a far cry from that discussed in the above hypothetical).
121 Sedighim v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., No. 0OCiv.7351, 2001 WL 1191009 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 5, 2001) (quoting Panfil v. ACC Corp., 768 F. Supp. 54, 58-59 (W.D.N.Y. 1991)).
122 Sule v. Kloehn Co., 149 F. Supp. 2d 135 (citing Rudd v. Suburban Lodges of Am., Inc., 67 F.
Supp. 2d 1366, 1370 (N.D. Ga. 1999) and In re Mobile Media Sec. Litig., 28 F. Supp. 2d 901, 924
(D.N.J. 1998)).
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court explained that FBH was really a doctrine about restricting the kinds of
evidence that could be the basis of inferences in securities class actions,
and not all securities fraud claims (the case at hand was one involving a
large purchaser of the securities who was suing the defendant directly)."3
A handful of courts have justified their use of hindsight evidence on
the grounds that the FBH doctrine does not restrict them to considering only
that evidence that can be described as "contemporaneous" (for example, a
whistle-blower who says that she was at the meetings in which company of-
ficials acknowledged they were intentionally misleading the public). In-
stead, these courts explain that, in certain narrow sets of circumstances
(such as when the time gap is small or where the company in question has a
highly effective information reporting system'24), hindsight and other non-
contemporaneous evidence can be considered. The point here is that these
discussions by the anti-FBH courts show that they recognize that FBH dis-
cussions in prior opinions suggest a bar on the use of hindsight evidence
123 See ED Medsystems, Inc. v. Echocath, Inc., 235 F.3d 865, 880-81 (3d Cir. 2000) (making the
point that the fear of frivolous lawsuits that is present in securities class actions was not present in this
case).
124 For example, in Novak itself, the appellate court held that the complaint alleged scienter with
sufficient particularity, even though the key piece of evidence that the plaintiffs presented was the com-
pany's disclosure of its overstatement of inventory levels. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 303-05 (2d
Cir. 2000); cf. COX ET AL., supra note 62, at 744 (discussing Novak and the court's decision not to re-
quire that the plaintiffs identify their confidential sources). Implicit in the court's decision to reverse the
district court appears to be the conclusion that large inventory overstatements are the kind of thing that
company officers typically know about. More directly on point is Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp.,
where the court, while acknowledging the line of courts saying that plaintiffs may not plead "fraud by
hindsight," said that this did not mean that plaintiffs had to plead "fraud with complete insight." 82 F.3d
1194, 1225 (1st Cir. 1996). In Shaw, in which the court did seem to find the fact that there was only a
short time gap between the date of the public offering and the release of bad news about the just com-
pleted quarter, the court suggested that it might be okay to make an exception to the general rule disfa-
voring hindsight evidence in those contexts in which the company in question had the kind of effective
reporting system that would have likely forewarned them about the bad quarterly results much earlier
than they disclosed them to the public. What the court said in its footnote 38 was, however, couched:
In asserting that defendants had direct knowledge of DEC's third quarter operating results as they
developed, plaintiffs allege that "[m]ore so than the management of most companies, DEC's man-
agement, including the Individual Defendants, was virtually immediately cognizant of the Com-
pany's sales information" by virtue of the company's use of "a highly-efficient reporting system
which allows the Company to forward sales and cost information to senior management virtually
as sales are made." The defendants argue that these allegations should be viewed with skepticism
and as the product of nothing more than "pure speculation." Speculation or not, we think that the
plaintiffs' allegations of a "highly-efficient reporting system" may speak to the question of how
defendants might have known what they allegedly knew, but absent some indication of the specific
factual content of any single report generated by the alleged reporting system, do not independ-
ently provide a factual basis for inferring any such knowledge. On balance, we do not think that
generalized allegations regarding the existence of an internal "reporting system" substantially as-
sist a securities-fraud complaint in overcoming the hurdle of Rule 9(b). See Pitten v. Jacobs, 903
F. Supp. 937, 949-50 (D.S.C. 1995); cf. Arazie v. Mullane, 2 F.3d 1456, 1467 (7th Cir. 1993) (re-
fusing to credit "scanty" allegations concerning internal documents, absent indication of "who pre-
pared the projected figures, when they were prepared, how firm the numbers were, or which
.. officers reviewed them").
Id. at 1224 n.38.
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and a requirement that only contemporaneous evidence be considered.
That, in turn, means that for these non-FBH courts to be able to justify their
use of hindsight evidence, they have to either explain why the FBH doctrine
does not apply to their case or why, despite the language in prior opinions,
the FBH doctrine allows for some consideration of hindsight evidence.'25
Courts also sometimes allow complaints based on hindsight in materi-
ality cases. In SEC v. Trikilis, the defendants protested that "materiality
like scienter, cannot be determined through hindsight."'126 In rejecting this
contention, the court explained that the FBH doctrine did not preclude the
court from considering subsequent events. Rather, according to this court,
the doctrine asserts only that the withheld information must be considered
material at the time it was withheld, not later. Notwithstanding the protes-
tations of this court (note that this was a government prosecution and not a
private class action), the signal from the other cases seems to be that hind-
sight evidence is not to be considered in making inferences.'27
125 Language along the following lines points to the pro-contemporaneous evidence (and anti-
hindsight evidence) position. In In re Vantive Corp. Securities Litigation, the judge explained that the
heightened factual pleading requirement of the PSLRA "is the single most important weapon against
pleading fraud by hindsight because it forces plaintiffs to reveal whether they base their allegations on
an inference of earlier knowledge drawn from later disclosures or from contemporaneous documents or
other facts." 110 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (emphasis added).
The language from a couple of non-FBH cases that was cited in a recent Massachusetts district court
opinion by Judge Saris (in which she was navigating around FBH) is illustrative of the point made in the
text:
Nonetheless, even when the true state of affairs does not come to light until after the defen-
dant's allegedly false statement, it is permissible in some instances to infer from the later disclo-
sure that the defendant's statement was knowingly or recklessly false when made. See, e.g., In re
Grand Casinos, Inc. Sec. Litig., 988 F. Supp. 1273, 1283 (D. Minn. 1997) ("while the underlying
facts on which plaintiffs rely are not contemporaneous with defendants' allegedly false statements,
they create a strong inference that defendants knew there were significant problems when the
statements were made."); In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., I F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1111 (D. Nev.
1998) (stating that there is no "bright line rule that any documents offered to allege statements
were false or misleading must either proceed the statements or be precisely contemporaneous with
them."). Some reliance on post-statement revelations is appropriate where, as here, no catastro-
phic event occurred between the time of the challenged statement and the revelation of the truth; it
is also appropriate when the nature of the problem is such that it likely would have been apparent
to management before it was disclosed to the public. See In re Stratosphere, I F. Supp. 2d at
1112; In re Grand Casinos, 988 F. Supp. at 1283. Moreover, the plaintiff provides allegations
which, if proven, would show that Raytheon's officers had contemporaneous knowledge of the
problems with the P-3 Orion contract. More specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the "Team 30"
group was assembled to investigate the schedule issues and cost overruns in February 1999.
In re Raytheon Sec. Litig.,157 F. Supp. 2d 131, 151 (D. Mass. 2001).
The language quoted from the cases that Judge Saris cites suggests that those courts were trying to
navigate around a presumption in favor of contemporaneous or ex ante evidence. In addition, to confirm
her use of the noncontemporaneous evidence, Judge Saris goes on to explain that "moreover," there is
contemporaneous evidence in this case-suggesting that she is attempting to protect her analysis against
reversal by an appellate court that sees her as permitting the pleading of "fraud by hindsight."
126 No. CV 92-1336, 1992 WL 301398, at *1 I (C.D. Cal. July 28, 1992).
127 To quote another exhortation: "[T]he merits of a securities-fraud claim must be adjudicated
'upon all the facts as of the time of the transaction and not upon a 20/20 hindsight view long after the
event."' Jaroslawicz v. Engelhard Corp., No. 84-3641, 1989 WL 32864, at *15-*16 (D.N.J. Apr. 5,
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The courts thus say that the FBH doctrine is a prohibition on using the
fact of a bad outcome as sufficient support for satisfying Rule 9(b)'s re-
quirement of specificity. The FBH doctrine is therefore not a means of as-
sessing the relevance of the bad outcome to the likelihood of fraud in an
unbiased fashion. The doctrine does not identify circumstances in which
the bad outcome itself would be more or less likely to support an allegation
of fraud. Neither does it identify the types of contemporary evidence that
would be more or less useful in assessing the likelihood of fraud.
2. The FBH Doctrine's Apparent Lack of "Bite ".-The analysis thus
far suggests that courts say that the FBH doctrine means that a bad outcome
is not to form the basis for a complaint in a securities fraud case. But do
they do so out of a belief that the outcome information is an unreliable indi-
cator of fraud? If so, this would suggest that an intuition about the hind-
sight bias motivates the FBH doctrine, even though the remedy for the bias
seems somewhat drastic. To assess this, we took a sample of 125 cases us-
ing the phrase FBH and examined their discussions of the FBH doctrine for
evidence that the doctrine influenced judicial assessments of the relevance
of outcome information1 21 If so, then the doctrine may be said to have
some "bite."
To our surprise, we found little evidence that judges cited the FBH
doctrine as support for declaring outcome information to be irrelevant; in
our terms, that the doctrine had some "bite." References to that effect oc-
curred in only one out of five FBH applications, even by a generous count.
In the majority of cases (100/125), the outcome appeared to have been
given full consideration and then, in most cases, rejected as inadequate to
support an allegation of fraud.
Furthermore, in twenty-one of the other twenty-five cases, the court
mentioned the FBH doctrine without any apparent connection to the out-
come. Only in four of these twenty-five cases did the court assert that out-
come formed an inadequate basis for an allegation of securities fraud
because of the unreliability of outcome evidence. Even in these cases, the
courts simply gave FBH as a justification for not drawing an inference in
favor of the plaintiffs from a piece of hindsight evidence.
The result that the FBH doctrine lacked bite, however, creates a bit of a
puzzle. As reported in the previous section, the articulation of FBH in the
opinion is usually good news for the defendant. They are more likely to
win such cases. Defendants argue vigorously that plaintiff's complaints de-
pend upon "fraud by hindsight," plaintiffs offer spirited replies, and courts
spill much ink categorizing a complaint as one involving FBH or not. Thus,
1989) (quoting In re Union Carbide Class Action Sec. Litig., 648 F. Supp. 1322, 1327 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(quoting Spielman v. Gen. Host Corp., 462 F. Supp. 190, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1975))).
128 The sample was only partially random. Since we were interested in the evolution of the doctrine
and its most recent form, we looked for "bite" in all the cases from 2002 (forty-nine opinions). To that,
we added seventy-six randomly chosen opinions from the years prior to 2001.
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the doctrine is not a meaningless one-it influences the outcome of securi-
ties cases. At the same time, the empirical evidence on the influence of the
doctrine and our review of the courts' articulation of the doctrine, could not
easily be reconciled with its application in practice. Resolving the compet-
ing debiasing and case management theories of the FBH doctrine helps re-
solve this somewhat, although complete resolution requires refining our
case management hypothesis in Part VI.
V. EVALUATING THE COMPETING HYPOTHESES
Part II set forth five sets of predictions from the debiasing and case-
management hypotheses. To recap, the debiasing hypothesis supposes that
the FBH doctrine is an effort to purge the system of the hindsight bias and
produce more accurate judgments. If that is the purpose of the FBH doc-
trine, one should observe the following: the doctrine will have more utility
later in the proceedings, when courts know more about the case and can
therefore discount the fact of the bad outcome; the doctrine will be applied
more to determinations of contingent materiality than scienter; the doctrine
will restructure the decision to apply ex ante standards of conduct; the doc-
trine will be used to benefit plaintiffs in some cases; and the doctrine will
improve over time, becoming more focused on eliminating hindsight. In
contrast, if the case management hypothesis is correct, then one should ob-
serve the following: the doctrine will be applied early, so as to maximize
judicial control over the cases; the doctrine will be applied mostly to sci-
enter; the doctrine will not set forth clear standards, but rather it will simply
facilitate judicial control with an admonition about hindsight; the doctrine
will not be used to help plaintiffs; and the doctrine will grow in usage, with-
out nuance.
A. Test 1: The Stage of the Proceedings
There are contexts in which hindsight evidence is likely to be more
helpful than biasing and vice versa. The key is whether the judge has the
information and decision-making ability to put herself in the same (or simi-
lar) position as the defendant manager. If the judge can do that, the rele-
vance of the bad outcome is minimal because the judge presumably has all
the tools she needs to make the same ex ante determination the managers
made. If, however, the judge has little evidence about the manager's posi-
tion, then the bad outcome is relevant to the likelihood that fraud occurred.
Thus, the greatest danger posed by the hindsight bias is after discovery. To
be sure, the outcome and hindsight biases might cloud judgment at the
pleadings stage, making defendants appear to have been engaged in fraud
when they were merely mistaken in their forecasts. The bad outcome, how-
ever, is relevant at this stage. If judges want a tool to engage in case man-
agement, reference to the problem of judging in hindsight might provide a
convenient assertion to legitimize judging the case early.
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The evidence that over 90 percent of FBH applications involve judg-
ments on the pleadings supports the case management hypothesis. Fur-
thermore, although published opinions in securities class actions more
commonly deal with the pleadings than with summary judgment,2 9 the
trend is stronger for cases citing FBH. 30 If courts were trying to debias
cases, they would attend more closely to the problem of hindsight at the
summary judgment stage than at the pleadings stage. That courts use the
doctrine more at the pleadings stage supports the case management hy-
pothesis.
B. Test 2: Materiality Versus Scienter
The data are also clear on the issues of materiality and scienter. The
dominant application of FBH is to scienter. Unlike the comparison of
pleadings and summary judgment, in which one would expect more plead-
ings cases regardless of the hypothesis, both scienter and materiality are es-
sential elements of a successful securities fraud claim and are available
issues to be raised in every case. To be sure, hindsight is only an issue in
contingent information cases, but contingent information is routinely a part
of securities cases. 131 Furthermore, since a plaintiff is apt to allege several
material misstatements, a court has multiple opportunities to cite the FBH
doctrine when assessing materiality. By contrast, scienter is only alleged
once per defendant. Combined with the more straightforward application of
the hindsight bias to contingent materiality than to scienter, the fact that so
few FBH cases assess contingent materiality constitutes evidence against
the debiasing hypothesis.
C. Test 3: The Substance of the Doctrine
The debiasing hypothesis suggests that judges will attempt to correct
for the hindsight bias by resting the decision on some form of ex ante stan-
dard of conduct for the defendant. At the least, judges will recognize that
mere awareness of the hindsight bias problem will not help them correct for
it. In neither the scienter nor the materiality contexts did we observe evi-
dence of this. Rather, the reasoning and supposed correction for the bias
matches the case management hypothesis.
The FBH doctrine appears to function as a heightened pleading stan-
dard. Courts assert that simply reciting the bad outcome and alleging that
the managers must have known this bad outcome would come to pass is not
enough to support and allegation of fraud. It is hard to trace such a remedy
129 As a general matter, the bulk of securities law opinions today tackle motion to dismiss disposi-
tions. Cf Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 13, at n. 113 (reporting, for a random sample of opinions, that
91 percent involved dispositions at the motion to dismiss).
130 See supra tbl.5 (setting forth comparative data for the 1997-2002 period).
131 For a discussion of the ubiquity of contingent information in securities cases, see Cox ET AL.,
supra note 62, at 44-52.
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to the problems of judgment that the hindsight bias creates. Arguably, the
remedy resembles the business judgment rule governing liability for corpo-
rate mismanagement. In that context, courts have concluded that because
the hindsight bias prevents them from reliably identifying negligent mis-
management after a bad outcome, they should refrain from holding corpo-
rate officers liable even when their conduct appears to be negligent.'32 If
courts concluded that hindsight prevents them from properly sorting fraud
from mistake in the securities context, then the refusal to find fraud in the
presence of a bad outcome alone would be a similar remedy. The problem,
however, is that the remedy is applied at the pleadings stage, not the sum-
mary judgment stage. At the pleadings stage, a bad outcome truly is rele-
vant to the likelihood of fraud. At this stage, the Federal Rules do not ask
the courts to make a judgment on the merits, and hence the remedy of fore-
closing further litigation is inappropriate. By foreclosing further proceed-
ings, courts are not saying that they do not trust their own judgment, but
that they do not trust the process of civil discovery to identify whether fraud
occurred. Concerns with the hindsight bias do not support such a broad
remedy.
Furthermore, as the cases show, judges sometimes make exceptions to
the FBH doctrine's prohibitions when they feel a case looks bad.'33 In ef-
fect, judges flag the problem with hindsight evidence, but they do not tie
their hands in a way that will protect them from being influenced by the
evidence. They allow cases to proceed past the pleadings when they be-
lieve there is some credible evidence of fraud. For example, the Trikilis
court was so taken with the apparent predictability of the subsequent events
that it reconstructed the FBH doctrine to allow it to consider these events
explicitly. In truth, this reconstruction might differ from the other cases
only in the transparency of the courts' decision-making processes. In ef-
fect, judges assume that identifying the problem and asserting that the issue
in question needs to be considered from an ex ante and not a hindsight per-
spective provides adequate protection.'34 Although the psychological re-
132 Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 619-23.
133 See supra Part IV.B.
134 Theresa Gabaldon suggested to us that one explanation for why judges have not come up with
more effective protections against the hindsight bias in the materiality/contingent information context is
that the Supreme Court's decision in Basic v. Levinson can be read as telling the lower courts that this is
a type of backward probabilistic evaluation that they can and should make (or allow the juries to make).
485 U.S. 224 (1988). In that context, it is interesting to note that the Basic court was rejecting Judge
Easterbrook's bright line rule for disclosure in Flamm v. Eberstadt, in which he concluded that the better
rule was to require managers to disclose merger talks only when they had reached a "price and struc-
ture" agreement. 814 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1987). Judge Easterbrook's rule would have been an effective
protection against the hindsight bias because it ties the determination to an easily verifiable externally
determined criterion (i.e., has the agreement as to price and structure been reached?). Judge Easter-
brook, in fact, expressed concern that allowing for a fuzzier determination would facilitate undesirable
second-guessing of managerial decisions. Id. at 1178. That said, the language in Flamm suggests that
Judge Easterbrook's primary reason for using this rule was something other than a concern about the
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search suggests that this identification will not be effective by itself, it pro-
vides judges with the justification to exercise discretion as to which cases
will go forward and which will be dismissed. Once again, the case man-
agement hypothesis is more consistent with actual judicial practice.
One exception to the FBH doctrine, in particular, reveals that the doc-
trine cannot really be said to remedy the problem of judging in hindsight.
In several cases the courts explain that citing contemporary evidence of
fraud will suffice to allow a complaint to proceed.'35 The problem with
such an exception is that the hindsight bias consists precisely of the ten-
dency of the outcome to affect how people assess contemporary informa-
tion. 36 At the time managers make a prediction or forecast, a whole range
of indicators are likely to both support and refute the reasonableness of that
forecast. Once the forecast fails, however, the evidence refuting the fore-
cast will come to be more significant. Plaintiffs will thus be able to cite this
contemporaneous evidence in support of a claim that managers could not
reasonably have believed their predictions. It is thus hard to see why the
availablility of contemporary information could possibly be a safeguard
against the hindsight bias.
This problem is particularly acute in the context of materiality. In
cases in which contingent materiality is an issue (essentially all cases in
which materiality is an issue in dispute), the contemporaneous evidence that
courts assert they must assess is precisely the evidence that the hindsight
bias will influence. The unripe information that plaintiffs allege to be mate-
rial is always contemporary and hence always fair game for the courts to
consider. So too would be other contemporary information that would give
added context to the unripe information. The managers' failure to disclose
the unripe information will thus seem less reasonable in hindsight than in
foresight. The acute problem of the hindsight bias in materiality cases thus
makes the lack of materiality cases particularly troubling for the debiasing
hindsight bias (i.e., he thought that it was sometimes in the interests of the shareholders for corporations
to be able to withhold information). Basic, 485 U.S. at 235 (citing Flamm, 814 F.2d at 1177).
Returning to Professor Gabaldon's hypothesis, there is at least some support in the cases for her sug-
gestion regarding the materiality of intra-quarterly results. There, lower courts had adopted the rule that
quarterly results were not material until the quarter was completed (i.e., a bright-line externally verifi-
able rule). See Zucker v. Quasha, 891 F. Supp. 1010 (D.N.J. 1995). As with Judge Easterbrook's rule in
Flamm, this is the kind of rule that would have protected against the hindsight bias because, regardless
of the quarterly results themselves, materiality would rest on whether the quarter was complete or not.
The First Circuit, in Shaw v. Digital, 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1996), however, rejected this position on
grounds that the Supreme Court had made clear in Basic that the lower courts were supposed to make
precisely these kinds of fuzzy materiality determinations. In sum, it is possible that Professor
Gabaldon's explanation shows why there are so few applications of the FBH doctrine in the context of
materiality and why effective protections against the hindsight bias have not been developed in this con-
text. But we still do not have an explanation for the lack of development of an effective protective
mechanism in the scienter context.
135 Sedighim v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 639 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
136 See supra Part II (describing the bias).
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hypothesis. It may be that the lack of materiality cases occurred precisely
because courts believe that contingent information is inherently contempo-
raneous to the fraud and therefore inherently reliable. If so, this constitutes
a profound failure to identify the role that hindsight might play in these
cases and a real failure for the debiasing hypothesis.
In effect, the substance of the FBH doctrine does little to eliminate the
influence of the hindsight bias. First, the hindsight bias might support a
preclusion of liability based solely on outcome information, but would not
preclude an entry into the civil discovery process. Second, the case law
shows that judges are willing to allow a case to proceed when, in their own
judgment, it seems like there might be fraud. Only if judges themselves are
not vulnerable to the hindsight bias would such an inquiry make sense as a
debiasing strategy. Third, the exception to the FBH doctrine that cases can
proceed if contemporaneous evidence of fraud exists also makes little sense
as a debiasing strategy because the hindsight bias implicates how such evi-
dence will be evaluated.
D. Test 4: Reverse Hindsight
Under the case management hypothesis, the use of the hindsight bias
correction is a convenient justification for excluding evidence that would
otherwise help keep a case alive. To the extent judges are seeking case
management, as opposed to correcting for the hindsight bias, one should not
be surprised to find an asymmetry in the treatment of hindsight evidence.
In other words, perhaps we will find that judges embrace hindsight evi-
dence when it facilitates the dismissal of a case.
Indeed they do. Courts embrace hindsight evidence in their extensive
and enthusiastic use of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine; something that has
been described in detail in the literature.'3 7 As noted in the discussion of the
hypotheses, this doctrine utilizes hindsight evidence of a warning (typically
given in the discussion of risks section of the prospectus) to say that the in-
vestors had had fair warning that things might turn out badly for them.
The point is that the court's view of what the importance of the warn-
ing should have been to reasonable investors ex ante is likely to be biased
by the knowledge of the outcome. Nevertheless, while using this doctrine,
the courts show little reluctance in using hindsight evidence to dismiss a
case-a result that once again supports the case management hypothesis,
but not the debiasing one.'38
137 See, e.g., Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 13, at 121-24; Allan Horwich, Section 11 of the Secu-
rities Act: The Cornerstone Needs Some Tuckpointing, 58 BUS. LAW. 1, 38-40 (2002); Langevoort, su-
pro note 85; O'Hare, supra note 85.
138 We have found a number of cases in which courts discuss FBH and bespeak caution in conjunc-
tion and apply both doctrines in the same case. See, e.g., In re Integrated Res. Real Estate Ltd. P'ships
Sec. Litig., 850 F. Supp. 1105, 1143-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 793
F. Supp. 543, 557 (D.N.J. 1992). One court even went so far as to suggest that bespeaks caution oper-
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E. Test 5: Evolutionary Path
Under the debiasing hypothesis, the law would evolve toward an effec-
tive protection against the bias. As judges see more cases that seem to raise
hindsight issues, they will be able to evaluate the performance of FBH in
prior cases and improve the doctrine to better reduce the biasing effects of
judging in hindsight. The doctrine, however, has not evolved this way.
The FBH doctrine originated with Judge Friendly's articulation in
Denny. In terms of the hindsight bias and making inferences, Judge
Friendly seems to have been on the right track-especially in suggesting
that intervening catastrophic events make it hard to draw a backward infer-
ence. Judge Easterbrook, in DiLeo, expanded Judge Friendly's conception
from, in a sense, disfavoring the pleading of fraud by hindsight to saying
that there is no fraud by hindsight. Since Judge Easterbrook, however, the
doctrine has evolved little. Our reading of the cases has revealed no im-
proved understanding of the doctrine over time. If anything, it has degener-
ated into a label that is attached to outcome evidence and claims that
outcome evidence is either disfavored or will not be considered. In sum,
the evolutionary story is not one of evolution towards accuracy, but rather
simple expansion.
VI. REFINING THE CASE MANAGEMENT HYPOTHESIS
In each of the tests described, the case management hypothesis came
out ahead of the debiasing hypothesis. It is clear that the FBH doctrine has
not evolved into an effective correction for the hindsight bias. Nor does it
appear that the doctrine is becoming a better corrective. Indeed, we ob-
served few signs of any evolutionary direction of the doctrine. All the
signs-the high victory rate for defendants, the high level of determinations
at the pleadings stage, and the abundant use of reverse hindsight in the be-
speaks caution context (often in the same case where FBH was used)-
pointed toward case management.
These findings are productive, but left us wanting to know more about
how the FBH doctrine helped judges manage cases. Our specification of
the case management hypothesis was broad in that we generally assumed
that judges, for many reasons, seek discretion to dismiss securities fraud
cases at an early stage of the proceedings. To attain a greater degree of
specificity, we tried to refine this hypothesis. One puzzle that arose from
the data that could help clarify the nature of the case management hypothe-
sis is the apparent lack of bite of the FBH doctrine. Even as courts recite
the words FBH, they do not use hindsight as support for the unreliability of
bad outcomes as evidence of fraud. At the same time that the doctrine
seemed to lack bite, it clearly had an effect on the proceedings; defendants
ated as a protection against the problem of judging in hindsight. Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 814 F.
Supp. 850, 858 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
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were more likely to be successful when courts assessed their assertions that
a complaint consisted of fraud by hindsight.
In an effort to reconcile these conflicting results, we refined the case
management hypothesis. Assume that judges believe that many lawsuits
are brought entirely for their settlement value, but that there are also a siz-
able number of meritorious ones. The frustration judges confront is that
both categories lead to settlements, with both companies and investors be-
ing net losers when the settlement occurs simply for nuisance reasons.
What the judge wants under these circumstances is a method for separating
the good cases from the bad before the pressure to settle grows (i.e., shortly
after the filing of the complaint) and before discovery.
The traditional post-complaint motions, such as motions to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action or summary judgment, do not work well
because of the factual nature of securities fraud claims. Plaintiffs readily
allege what would be fraud if true. What the moderate judge needs are
tools to dismiss cases, as a matter of law, looking at little more than what is
in the complaint. The late 1980s and early 1990s brought an explosion of
doctrines that let judges do this and hence operate to give judges more
power over the fate of a lawsuit at the outset of litigation. 39 Presumably, a
judge's willingness to grant these motions-whatever the particular doc-
trinal invention-reflects her view of the potential merits of the case.
We suspect that the FBH doctrine is such an invention, but must ex-
plain why it seems to be doing less work than meets the eye. One clue
comes from the doctrine's beginnings in Denny. The case is often cited for
a broader proposition than just a caution about hindsight evidence: It reads
as a call for plaintiffs to plead more facts in their complaints than normal
"notice pleading." Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules demands that fraud be
pleaded with particularity, although state of mind can be averred generally.
What Denny and its progeny famously did is place a substantial gloss on
that and demand that facts giving rise to a "strong inference" of intentional
fraud be presented in plaintiffs' complaint. If the judge was not persuaded
that there was a strong enough inference of fraud, the case would be dis-
missed immediately. Until Congress codified the "strong inference" re-
quirement in 1995, there was a split among the circuits on whether this
heightened pleading standard was permissible.40 Most notably, the Ninth
Circuit said no, preferring a literal reading of Rule 9(b). 4 '
139 Other such doctrines included the "puffery" defense and the "bespeaks caution" doctrine. See
Langevoort, supra note 38, at 310 (observing that the explosion in securities fraud class action cases in
the mid-1980s and the early 1990s coincided with the creation of a number of judge-made doctrines that
helped the judges tackle these cases).
140 See Fairman, supra note 47, at 599-601 ("By making it more difficult for defrauded investors to
pursue their claims on the merits, the PSLRA may actually encourage more securities fraud.").
141 See id. at 598-99.
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The possible connection between FBH and a heightened pleading stan-
dard seems obvious. FBH is another way of saying that plaintiffs must
have more in their complaints than just backwards induction from the fact
that a problem subsequently surfaced-there have to be facts showing
awareness at the time of the fraud. What we suspect, then, is that the FBH
doctrine was really an early articulation of the judicial desire to see more in
complaints than skeletal inferences about scienter. It expressed, in a catchy
way, the judge's sense that a complaint was lacking in particularized facts.
Our revised hypothesis was that over time-and especially as of 1995-the
heightened pleading requirement had ripened so that it would do the real
work as judges sifted through complaints to decide whether they had
enough merit to go forward. FBH, just a prototype, became largely a catch-
phrase. A judge still might use it, but simply to describe a holding that, for
all practical purposes, was the result of applying the heightened pleading
standard.
Happily, this refinement to the hypothesis is testable. If the hypothesis
is true, we would expect to see relatively few FBH cases in the Ninth Cir-
cuit and its districts prior to the passage of the PSLRA in 1995. As Table
VI indicates, this is what we see. Despite the fact that the Ninth Circuit
consistently has the largest number of securities cases-approximately one-
third of all securities class action filings in any given year are in the Ninth
Circuit-there was almost no use of FBH in the pre-1995 era. For almost
all of this period, fewer than 10 percent of the FBH cases are from the
Ninth Circuit. 4 2 That amounts to no more than one or two cases a year.
With the enactment of the PSLRA in 1995, this changed. The PSLRA im-
poses heightened scienter pleading standards on all the circuits and subse-
quently the use of FBH in the Ninth Circuit begins to more closely
approximate the patterns in the other circuits.
The results from the Ninth Circuit also confirm the rejection of the de-
biasing and an extreme version of the case management stories. If those
evolutionary path stories held, we would expect them to manifest them-
selves most clearly in the circuit with the most securities cases, the Ninth
Circuit. Either in terms of learning how to best correct for the hindsight
bias or being frustrated with the time and effort that securities cases were
taking, one would expect Ninth Circuit judges to be ahead of the others.
Yet, what we see is that the Ninth does not pick up on FBH until well after
the others; specifically, it picks up on FBH after it receives congressional
approval.
142 These differences are statistically significant: p < .001, by Fisher's exact z.
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TABLE 6: FILINGS AND FBH CASES IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT VERSUS THE
OTHER CIRCUITS
# of FBH % of FBH # of Case % of Cases
Year Cases in Ninth Cases Filed in Filings in Filed in the
/ # of FBH Ninth Circuit Ninth / # of Ninth
Cases in all Case Filings Circuit
Circuits in all
Circuits
143
1980-89 1/18 6% -
1990 1/3 33% -
1991 1/24 4% 35/105 33%
1992 1/22 5% 51/146 35%
1993 2/22 9% 45/130 35%
1994 1/15 7% 60/167 36%
1995 5/26 19% 53/129 41%
(PSLRA)
1996 2/19 11% 26/82 32%
1997 3/18 17% 50/148 34%
1998 4/19 21% 17/42 40%
1999 7/25 28% 32/122 26%
2000 6/42 14% -
2001 4/39 11% -
2002 8/49 16% -
So, the refined case management hypothesis fits the data better than ei-
ther the debiasing or an extreme version of the case management hypothe-
ses. The balancing of agency costs is more measured and nuanced than in
either hypothesis. The FBH doctrine operates as a rule of thumb, but the
story is not as simple as saying that judges use FBH to dismiss cases be-
cause they dislike them. Instead, judges balance the likelihood of frivolous
filings against the likelihood that there was real fraud. FBH operates as
143 As an approximation, we use the figures from Mukesh Bajaj et al., Securities Class Action Set-
tlements: An Empirical Analysis (Nov. 16, 2000), at http://securities.stanford.edu/research/studies/
20001116_SSRNBajaj.html. These are figures for a representative sample of cases that the authors
collected from the Securities Class Action Alert. See id. at 2-3 & tbl.l.l, panel E. The pattern in the
Bajaj sample, where the Ninth Circuit makes up approximately 30 percent of all the securities class ac-
tion filings in any given year, is similar to that described in other studies. See Laura E. Simmons, Secu-
rities Lawsuits: Settlement Statistics for lOb-5 Cases tbl.1 (1997), at http://www.comerstone.com/
pdfs/seclaw.pdf; Laura E. Simmons, Post-Reform Act Securities Case Settlements: Cases Reported
Through December 2002 tbl.I (1999), at http://www.comerstone.com/pdfs/settle.pdf. Both studies re-
port that roughly 30 percent of the settlements in such cases are from the Ninth Circuit.
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something of a place marker for the judges or, to use a different metaphor, a
hook they can hang their hats on. Cases on one side (with hindsight evi-
dence and little more) are presumptively frivolous and are treated with
skepticism. On the other side, the cases with contemporaneous evidence
are given more leeway. Most cases fit the former characterization and get
knocked out. But when there are exceptional circumstances and the hind-
sight evidence of fraud is strong, the courts attempt to navigate around the
rule of thumb.
We need not take a position on whether the FBH doctrine is a sound
invention or conclude that, as applied, it displays moderation. As scholars
have pointed out, it is possible that the heightened pleading standard is a
mistake-that discovery should occur in an effort to expose the facts under-
lying a fraud claim upon a lower standard than "strong inference."'" This
criticism stems from the belief that even if judges are well-intentioned, the
complaint stage is too early for any sensible determination of whether the
suit has merit. Once basic pleading rules are satisfied, plaintiffs should be
afforded at least some discovery.
Not enough is known about the incidence of frivolous litigation to be
confident in any policy reform. On the other hand, there is evidence that
investors themselves perceive the winnowing of securities fraud claims as a
good thing.'45 What is clear, however, is that judges are actively managing
the entry and exit of cases at the pleading stage. In a sense, then, the
PSLRA's heightened pleading standards and the FBH doctrine are not just
about raising the bar to entry into court, but also about granting the judges
more discretion in deciding who gains entry and who does not.
This story poses a risk. In reality, we suspect most judges are unclear
about what the FBH doctrine is. They are likely to have read a few cases
discussing FBH, but to have little sense of the patterns in the doctrine.
They will know that prior courts have stated that it is well-established that
their circuit does not permit the pleading of "fraud by hindsight" and that
that amounts to disfavoring hindsight evidence. For the most part, this is
not a problem because these are going to be cases that the judges want to
dismiss under Rule 9(b). Uttering the phrase "fraud by hindsight" to char-
acterize the case serves as a rhetorical flourish to describe the judge's gut
feeling. The problem, however, is in the few cases in which the plaintiffs'
case rests on hindsight evidence and the hindsight evidence is highly sug-
gestive of fraud. Some judges will figure out ways around the barriers they
see the FBH doctrine imposing.'46 The problem, however, arises with those
144 See, e.g., Charles M. Yablon, A Dangerous Supplement? Longshot Claims and the Private Se-
curities Litigation, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 567, 572 (2000) (arguing that heightened pleading requirements
encourage fraud).
145 See Karen Johnson et al., In re Silicon Graphics Inc., Shareholder Wealth Effects Resulting from
the Interpretation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's Pleading Standard, 73 S. CAL. L.
REv. 773 (2000).
146 See Aldridge v. A.T. Cross Corp., 284 F.3d 72, 81-82 (1st Cir. 2002) (in which defendants use
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judges who perceive fraud, but see the FBH doctrine as an independent and
insurmountable barrier. In the hundred-plus cases we examined for bite, we
found a handful where this appears to have been the case.1 47
Zucker v. Quasha is one such case.'48 Zucker involved the direct-mail
company, Hanover Direct. In 1994, Hanover publicly issued securities near
the end of its first quarter. Specifically, at the offering point, 95 percent of
the quarter had concluded.'49 Hanover made no disclosures about the quar-
ter in progress. Soon thereafter (and after the offering was complete),
Hanover disclosed that the company's return rates for the just-concluded
quarter had dropped from their previous mark and that the response rates for
its mailings had been lower than usual. 5 The plaintiffs asked the court to
infer from the company's later disclosure of full quarter results that, at the
point of the offering, when 95 percent of the quarter had been completed,
the company must have known about these downward trends. The court,
having set up the discussion by saying that pleading fraud by hindsight was
not permitted, refused, saying:'5'
Even if HDI had some duty to disclose financial data for a fiscal quarter in
progress, Plaintiff has simply failed to allege any facts capable of supporting a
FBH to argue that the court should not infer from defendants' admissions as to certain contingencies in
1999 that these were known in 1998, but the court finds the inferences reasonable); Shaw v. Digital, 82
F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1996) (putting forth this fact scenario: soon after conducting a large public offering,
company announces a large quarterly loss and then argues that plaintiffs are not entitled to the inference
that the company may have known about the potential losses prior to the public offering; the court re-
jects the FBH argument on the grounds that the proximity in time makes the inference reasonable in this
case); Allaire Corp. Sec. Litig., 224 F. Supp. 2d 319, 329 (D. Mass. 2002) (in which defendants argue
that FBH bars the court from contrasting company's announcement of disastrous results with earlier op-
timistic statements and inferring that earlier statements were false; the court sidesteps the argument by
saying that, in this case, the contrast was so stark as to justify an exception to FBH).
147 It is possible that the judges in these cases thought that the hindsight evidence was inadequate
regardless of FBH and that it was not that FBH imposed a barrier, but rather that they were using FBH
as a justification for knocking out the case (in other words, the case management hypothesis). The fol-
lowing are the handful of cases we found. See Faulkner v. Verizon Communications, 156 F. Supp. 2d
384 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (announcement that merger has been terminated follows shortly after announce-
ment that it was "on track," but the court refuses to infer backwards on account of FBH); Zeid v. Kim-
berley, 930 F. Supp. 431, 436 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (company makes a number of optimistic statements
regarding its future immediately prior to an offering of securities and soon thereafter announces disap-
pointing results for the quarter at hand; the court, however, refuses to infer backwards on account of
FBH); Zucker v. Quasha, 891 F. Supp 1010, 1014, 1017 (D.N.J. 1995) (same).
148 Zucker, 891 F. Supp at 1010.
149 Id. at 1013. The first quarter of 1994 ended three days before the Prospectus and Registration
Statement became effective. Id. at 1018.
150 Id. at 1015.
151 The set up language was:
A court evaluates whether the statement or omission was misleading at the time it was made.
Trump Casino, 793 F. Supp. at 553. "'[F]raud by hindsight,' the attempt to impose liability on
management for unrealized economic predictions, is not actionable." Id. at 551 (quoting Sinay v.
Lamson & Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037, 1040 (6th Cir.1991)).
Id. at 1014.
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reasonable inference that HDI's statement that the return rate for 1993 was
13% was misleading at the time it was made.' 52
But there were facts from which one could infer. The company had
done a public offering of securities to the public, had not disclosed anything
about the quarter in progress (that was 95 percent over), and later disclosed
that the quarter in progress had produced disappointing results. To us, there
seems to have been plenty of evidence from which to infer that the com-
pany likely knew something; certainly enough evidence to merit the plain-
tiffs getting to discovery.'53 The court, however, waved the FBH mantra
and said that plaintiffs failed to allege any worthwhile facts. In other
words, the court thought that the facts just described were tainted because
they constituted hindsight evidence and as a result discarded what would
have otherwise been good evidence.
Had the judges in Zucker and the handful of similar cases known what
we know after this study, that is, that the FBH doctrine should not be read
as imposing an additional barrier to Rule 9(b), perhaps their cases would
have come out differently. It bears reiterating though that cases like Zucker
are the exception, not the norm.
CONCLUSION
This project began with the goal of using the evolution of the FBH
doctrine to test two alternate conceptions of judicial behavior. The first had
judges recognizing the judicial system's cognitive biases and making cor-
rections for them, while the second had them using the excuse that they
were correcting for the hindsight bias as a front for managing their case
loads. Doctrines such as FBH, we hypothesized, evolved over time to ef-
fectively further the goal in question. Even though judges are human, prone
to error and bias, and subject to time and other constraints, the evolutionary
process should allow us to model the doctrines in aggregate as if the judges
were acting rationally and effectively. The data on the FBH doctrine, how-
ever, support the case management hypothesis rather than the debiasing
one.
We also found that the case management hypothesis was more com-
plex than initially hypothesized. The FBH doctrine is a rule of thumb that
simplifies decision-making by heightening the barriers to entry into court.
But it is a discretionary standard that allows judges to carve exceptions
when they suspect fraud. Viewed that way, the FBH doctrine becomes
synonymous with the heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA. And
this is what the data suggest: It is a case management technique that judges,
152 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Trump Casino, 793 F. Supp. at 553, the case cited earlier for the
FBH proposition). The court makes the same point about there being no evidence from which to infer
the plaintiffs' claim about the lower return rates. Id. at 1019.
153 The events at issue having taken place in 1994, this was a pre-PSLRA case.
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invoking the authority of Judge Friendly first and then Judge Easterbrook,
created for themselves and that was subsequently ratified by Congress in
1995.
In terms of corrections for the hindsight bias, federal judges in securi-
ties cases, it would seem, are not intuitive psychologists. Rather, their de-
velopment of the FBH doctrine can best be described as an example of
"nafve cynicism."'' 4 Even as the judges in these cases identify a real, tangi-
ble problem in human judgment, they express the belief that the problem
does not affect their own judgment. Instead of developing the doctrine into
a clear rule about what constitutes fraud by hindsight, judges rely on their
own intuition to sort out facts that suggest real problems and facts that sug-
gest nothing more than fraud by hindsight. Therein arises the paradox of
these cases: Judges simultaneously claim that human judgment cannot be
trusted, and yet they rely on their judgment.
The naively cynical approach judges have taken to the FBH doctrine
seems to have found the worst of both worlds. If judges' judgment is af-
fected by hindsight, then some cases that are wholly without merit might
remain in the system, supported by inferences based on hindsight, and some
cases that really involve fraud might be dismissed. Rather than a nuanced
approach to the problem of sorting fraud from mistake, securities regulation
is governed by moods. In the 1980s and 1990s, as concern with frivolous
securities litigation rose, courts and Congress simply made it more difficult
for plaintiffs to file suit. In the post-Enron era, this skepticism about private
enforcement of securities fraud might have abated somewhat, leading to
lesser pleading requirements. The courts simply raise and lower the bar for
private litigation. In the absence of a sensible mechanism for sorting fraud
from mistake, the deterrent effort of private securities litigation will be slim,
at best.
154 See Justin Kruger & Thomas Gilovich, "Naive Cynicism" in Everyday Theories of Responsibil-
ity Assessment: On Biased Assumptions of Bias, 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 743, 743-44
(1999) (discussing the difficulty with identifying bias in oneself).
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